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tems with a small-open-economy version of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and
John Moore’s (1997) model. We find that 47 countries in 1980s and
48 countries in 1990s out of 98 countries establish collateral-based
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1 Introduction
Collateral-based lending systems seem prevalent in most countries. However,
it is not obvious whether it is actually embedded in all countries. It is
important to investigate whether a collateral-based lending system functions
in an economy because many researchers often presume collateral constraints
when studying business cycles or economic growth.
The importance of credit market imperfections in understanding macroe-
conomic phenomena has been emphasized ever since the seminal paper by
Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1989).1 More recently, a large number of
articles have attempted to address topics in financial crises, in which credit
market imperfections play an important role. However, if collateral-based
lending is not embedded in an economy, one will be at a risk of deriving
inadequate policy implications from models with collateral constraints.
To the best of our knowledge, however, few studies have focused on the
fundamental question concerning which countries establish collateral-based
lending systems in their financial sectors, although, as cited below, there are
some articles that investigate lending systems in specific countries. One of
the objectives of this paper is to detect countries that establish collateral-
based lending systems with only macroeconomic data.2 We also address
1Typical examples of empirical studies on finance and growth include Robert G. King
and Ross Levine (1993), Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten Beck (2000), and
Phileppe Aghion, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes (2005). See also Jeremy Green-
wood and Boyan Jovanovic (1990), Oded Galor and Joseph Zeira (1993), Jeremy Green-
wood and Bruce D. Smith (1997), and Phileppe Aghion, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-
Foulkes (2005) for the theoretical literature on finance and growth. For business cycles and
credit market imperfections, see Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore (1997) and Kiminori
Matsuyama (2007) among others. For financial market globalization and credit market
imperfections, see Matsuyama (2004). Matsuyama (2008) provides a clear review of the
macroeconomic implications of credit market imperfections.
2The role of collateral has been investigated both theoretically and empirically in the
literature on banking. Theoretically, it has been demonstrated that the problems of ad-
verse selection and moral hazard are mitigated by collateral. See Helmut Bester (1985,
1994) and Arnoud W.A. Boot, Anjan V. Thakor, and Gregory F. Udell (1991) among
others. Moreover, Michael Manove, A Jorge Padilla, and Marco Pagano (2001) show that
collateral is a substitute for screening and monitoring eﬀorts of creditors, whereas Stanley
D. Longhofer and Joao A.C. Santos (2000) demonstrate that it is a complement to them.
Empirically, the role of collateral in relationship lending has been extensively studied. For
surveys of recent research on relationship lending, see Arnoud W.A. Boot (2000) and Elyas
Elyasiani and Lawrence G. Goldberg (2004). Evidence for the role of collateral in relation-
ship lending is mixed. For instance, a negative relationship of collateral with relationship
lending is found by Allen N. Berger and Gregory F. Udell (1995), Dietmar Harhoﬀ and
Timm Ko¨rting (1998), Ivan E. Brick and Darius Palia (2007), and Gabriel Jime´nez, Vi-
cente Salas, and Jesus Saurina (2006), whereas a positive relationship is demonstrated by
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a question about the origin of collateral-based lending. In particular, we
demonstrate that the legal protection of lenders promotes the establishment
of a collateral-based lending system.
By a “collateral-based lending system,” we mean a system in which col-
lateral holding is a requirement for borrowers to access credit in the financial
market. In the literature on banking, researchers have investigated lending
systems in specific countries with microeconomic data. For example, in the
United States, where the financial sector is fully developed, most agents can
access credit, even if they do not hold collateral, whereas some agents are
preventinted from accessing credit for other reasons. Robert E. Hall and
Frederic S. Mishkin (1982) and Tullio Jappelli (1990) estimate that approx-
imately 20 percent of the United States consumers are credit-constrained.
According to the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, only 8.6 percent of the
rejected applicants for credit were rejected because they had insuﬃcient as-
sets as collateral. The rest of the rejected applicants were rejected for other
reasons.3
According to research on Italy’s lending system by Daniela Fabbri and
Mario Padula (2004), whether households hold suﬃcient collateral does not
matter for their obtaining credit from financial intermediaries.4 This means
that even though households hold suﬃcient collateral, they cannot easily
acquire credit from financial intermediaries. Whether they can access credit
depends upon the legal enforceability of each judicial district in Italy.
A further example is “related lending” in Mexico, which has been in-
vestigated by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lop´ez-de-Silanes, and Guillermo
Zamarripa (2003). According to their research, due to the privatization of
government-owned commercial banks from the late 1980s to the early 1990s,
banks were obtained by local families that already controlled industrial firms.
In Mexico, related lending was unregulated in 1990s, and during this time,
banks owned by local families largely loaned to their related parties with
lower collateral requirements compared to unrelated parties. This lending
behavior weakens a collateral lending system.
From these studies, we predict that collateral lending systems are not
established in the United States, Italy, or Mexico. Indeed, our estimation
Hans Degryse and Patrick Van Cayseele (2000) and Arito Ono and Iichiro Uesugi (2009).
In this paper, we do not address a question about the role of collateral at a microeconomic
level. Our perspective is macroeconomic, and again our objective is to search out countries
with collateral-based lending systems comprehensively.
3For a summary of the survey, see table 1 of Tullio Jappelli (1990).
4See table 3 of Daniela Fabbri and Mario Padula (2004).
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results are consistent with this prediction.
By contrast, collateral-based lending systems seem to be used in Costa
Rica and Japan. As demonstrated by Alexander Monge-Naranjo, Javier Cas-
cante, and Luis J. Hall (2001), borrowers’ collateral holding is one of the most
important criteria when they are granted loans by financial intermediaries.
Their paper reports that Costa Rica’s financial sector establishes a collateral-
based lending system. Likewise, there is much evidence of Japan’s banking
sector that, as long as borrowers held land as collateral, they could access
credit in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Mitsuhiro Fukao (2003), due to
the deregulation of a financial sector in Japan since the mid-1980s, large listed
companies gradually shifted their financial resources from banks to the cap-
ital markets. As a result, banks were urged to find a new market, and most
banks commenced real estate lending, where their judgments on investment
projects associated with loans relied exclusively on whether borrowers held
collateral with little attention to the cash flow of the investment projects.
Fukao’s research tells us that Japan’s lending system seems to have gradu-
ally shifted toward collateral-based lending since the mid 1980s. Moreover,
Arito Ono and Iichiro Uesugi (2009) provide evidence from Japan’s small
and medium-sized enterprise market that more than 70% of the investigated
firms pledge collateral. These observations from the cases of Costa Rica and
Japan are consistent with our estimation results.
One additional example is the case of Thailand’s lending system. Lukas
Menkhoﬀ, Doris Neuberger, and Chodechai Suwanaporn (2006) provide ev-
idence that collateral-based lending is prevalent in Thailand and conclude
that collateral seems to be more important in an emerging market than in
a developed one. Chutatong Charumilind, Raja Kali, and Yupana Wiwat-
tanakantang (2006) reveal not only relationship lending but also collateral-
based lending in long-term loan contracts in Thailand before the financial
crisis in 1997. Firms that had close relationships with banks needed much
less collateral to obtain long-term loans than those without such relation-
ships. The practice of relationship lending weakened the collateral lending
system, as in the case of Mexico. Nevertheless, we find from their examina-
tion that the collateral-based lending system functioned steadily before the
crisis.5 These microeconomic findings are also consistent with our findings.
While using microeconomic data, as was performed in the studies cited
above, seems suitable for addressing our questions, we incur a great cost to
examine many countries with microeconomic data for each country. In this
5See tables 4 and 5 of Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006).
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paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model following Kenneth
Kasa (1998) and Takuma Kunieda and Akihisa Shibata (2005), which is a
small-open-economy version of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore’s (1997)
model (KM model, henceforth) to test whether a collateral-based lending sys-
tem is established in a country with only macroeconomic data. To address
our questions, we first derive a closed-form solution for the current account
dynamics associated with private credit. The KM model is suitable for inves-
tigating whether a collateral-based lending system is established in a country
because in their model, potential borrowers can access credit in the financial
market only when they hold collateral. In other words, if the KM model is
statistically rejected in a country, then we judge that collateral-based lending
is not a major lending system in that country.
We presume that an answer to the second question about the origin of
collateral-based lending is in the rule of law. The relationship of the rule of
law with the development of financial sectors has been investigated in the
extensive literature since the pioneering work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lop´ez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1997, 1998).6 Ac-
cording to these authors, the development of a country’s financial market
is restricted by the degree of legal protection of outside investors. If laws
are protective of lenders, they are willing to lend borrowers and thus, the
development of the financial sector is promoted. Meanwhile, if laws are not
protective of lenders, the financial sector is stagnant. They demonstrate that
historical legal origins account for the contemporary structure of laws and
financial development. However, this literature has not focused on the rela-
tionship between the type of the lending system and the degree of the legal
protection of lenders. Our research sheds light on this point.
We experiment on 98 countries. We find that collateral-based lending
systems are established in approximately half of the estimated countries and
that countries with good legal protection of lenders are more likely to estab-
lish collateral-based lending systems.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide a theoret-
ical ground for our empirical study. In section 3, we describe the data for our
estimation. In section 4, we compare the estimation results of the United
Sates and Japan, and in section 5 we show the estimation results for the
other countries. In section 6, we study the origin of collateral-based lending.
Section 7 contains our concluding remarks.
6For this literature, see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lop´ez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer
(2008).
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2 Theoretical Ground
In the appendix, we obtain a closed-form solution for the current account
dynamics associated with private credit by following Kasa (1998) and Ku-
nieda and Shibata (2005). The closed-form solution for the current account
dynamics around the steady state of the economy is given by:
CAt = βR CAt−1 + β∆Zt − (1− β)Ψλxˆ∆PCt−1, (1)
where CA, PC, and xˆ are the current account, private credit, and land held
by borrowers in the steady-state, respectively. Z is a so-called net output,
which is defined by the output minus the sum of investment and government
expenditure, and ∆ stands for the first diﬀerence in the variable. λ is the
proportion of collaterally constrained agents, and Ψ is a constant defined in
the appendix. The parameters, β and R, are the subjective discount factor
and the world interest rate, respectively. See the appendix for more details.
If there are collaterally constrained agents, then it follows that λ > 0 in
Eq.(1). Intuitively, production resources are allocated ineﬃciently if agents
in the economy are collaterally constrained. In particular, the land is less
allocated to borrowers and more allocated to savers in our model compared to
the case in which a credit market is perfect. In this situation, if the collateral
constraint is relaxed at time t−1 due to an anticipation of an increase in the
land price, then constrained borrowers raise their borrowing and investment
in land. Accordingly, production ineﬃciency is corrected and the aggregate
production in the whole economy will increase at time t. The increase in
production leads to an increase in total savings in the whole economy, which
positively aﬀects the current account. The term β∆Zt in Eq.(1) reflects this
eﬀect.
The reallocation of land from unconstrained agents to constrained agents
does not aﬀect the consumption behavior of unconstrained agents. This is
because their investment in the land market and savings in the credit market
are perfect substitutes in their consumption smoothing. Therefore, the Euler
equation of an unconstrained agent, Eq.(12), in the appendix, is not subject
to the land price. This means that, without technological shocks which aﬀect
the agents’ permanent income, the reallocation of land does not aﬀect the
consumption of the unconstrained agents.
By contrast, the consumption behavior of constrained agents is aﬀected
by the land price, as observed with Eq.(16) in the appendix. As the land
price increases, each constrained agent’s consumption increases as well. Due
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to credit constraints, their investment in the land market and saving in the
credit market are not perfect substitutes for them. It is better for them
to raise borrowing and invest more in land because their marginal revenue
involving an increase in the land price is greater than the market interest
rate. Then, their consumption smoothing is subject to the land price, even
though technological shocks, which aﬀect the agents’ permanent income, do
not occur. Accordingly, the aggregate consumption in the whole economy
goes up as the land price increases. This phenomenon is reflected in the
third term of Eq.(1), which negatively aﬀects the current account.
If there are no collaterally constrained agents, then it follows that λ = 0
in Eq.(1). We statistically examine whether λ = 0 or not, where the null
hypothesis is λ = 0 and the alternative hypothesis is λ > 0. If we cannot
reject the null hypothesis for a country under a reasonable size of the test, we
infer that a theoretical model with collateral constraints cannot be applied to
the country and thus a collateral-based lending system is not established in
the country, whereas if we reject the null hypothesis, we think of the country
as being collaterally constrained.
While we basically use Eq.(1) to examine the hypothesis, we have two
additional estimable equations. The first is Eq.(34) in the appendix, which
is inserted below:
∆qt+1 = Ψ∆PCt. (2)
This equation is used as the first test of the existence of collateral-based
lending if the land price is observable. If there are no collaterally constrained
borrowers, Eq.(2) does not hold and there is thus no direct relationship be-
tween the first diﬀerence in the land price and the lagged first diﬀerence in
private credit.
The second equation is Eq.(23) in the appendix, which is rewritten as
follows:
CAt = βR CAt−1 + β∆Zt − (1− β)λxˆ∆qt, (3)
where qt is the land price. In these equations, if λ = 0, the coeﬃcients of
∆qt are equal to zero. As long as we obtain the data for land prices, we
can statistically examine the significance of the coeﬃcient of ∆qt. If the null
hypothesis of λ = 0 is rejected in a country, we conclude that a collateral-
based lending system is established in the country.
If we observe land prices, we can use Eqs.(2) and (3).7 However, the
number of countries for which the data for land prices are available is limited.
7One might argue that there are assets that can be collateral other than land. For
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Moreover, the data for private credit are available in most countries. In
addition, the quality of the data for land prices is not high. If we try to
assemble the data for land prices, we can hardly avoid using “the house price
index” as a proxy for a land price in most countries. By contrast, we can
collect accurate (or at least, more accurate than land prices) data for private
credit. Therefore, a closed-form solution for the current account associated
with private credit is fascinating to us when examining our model. In this
paper, we will use the two estimable equations (2) and (3) for two countries
in particular, the United States and Japan, to see their contrasting outcomes.
The other question of our paper concerns the origin of collateral-based
lending. We presume that the answer to this question is in the rule of law. By
empirically estimating Eq.(1), we judge whether a collateral-based lending
system is established in a country and create an index to which a 1 is assigned
if a collateral-based lending system is present and a 0 otherwise. The index
is regressed on the measure of legal protection and other control variables to
determine whether legal protection is the origin of collateral-based lending.
3 Data
Depending upon data availability, we prepared an annual dataset of 98 coun-
tries. In the process of data gathering, we eliminated countries for which we
could not observe data points for at least 19 years. In the second column
of table A2 in the online appendix, the estimation period for each country
is entered, where the maximum and minimum numbers of observations are
forty-six and eighteen, respectively.89
To obtain the data for the current account, CA, and the net output, Z,
we assembled the gross national product (GNP), the gross domestic product
(GDP), aggregate consumption, aggregate investment, government expen-
diture, exports, and imports from the database of International Financial
Statistics, which was created by the International Monetary Fund. All these
instance, asset-based lending to small firms associated with inventories is becoming popular
in the United States. Nevertheless, we use only land prices to examine Eqs. (2) and (3)
because we believe that land is still common collateral in a collateral-based lending system.
8Note that the lagged current account is incorporated in the estimation equation. That
is why our minimum number of observations is eighteen and not nineteen.
9For some eurozone countries, we gave up using the data from approximately 1999
onward to avoid the risk of data discontinuity. There are missing data points of private
credit around those years and the database of International Financial Statistics arranges
the data points in question in diﬀerent tables from approximately 1999 onward for some
eurozone countries.
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variables are deflated by the consumer price index.
The data for the current account, CA, are generally computed from GNP,
aggregate consumption, aggregate investment, and government expenditure.
For some countries, however, GNP, aggregate consumption, or government
expenditure is not available. In these cases, we compute the current account
from exports and imports, although the net investment income from abroad
is not taken into account. Because most countries for which we cannot ob-
serve those variables are less developed, small countries, the net investment
income from abroad in these countries is assumed to be so small that we may
ignore them in computing the current account.10 The net output is computed
as the gross domestic product minus aggregate investment and government
expenditure.
The data for private credit were collected from the database of the finan-
cial structure created by Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten Beck
(2000) and updated by them in 2010. In the database, we have a variable
entitled “Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial In-
stitutions/GDP,” which is the private credit/GDP ratio. To obtain the data
for private credit, PC, we multiply the real gross domestic product by the
ratio.
For Japan’s land price, the Nationwide Urban Land Price Index created
by the Japan Real Estate Institute is used. In particular, we use the land
price index of all urban land (DPL1) and the land price index of six major
cities (DPL2) in the dataset. For the United States’ land price, we assembled
the data for the price index for residential land from the dataset entitled “De-
cennial Census of Housing-Based price index: aggregate land data, annual,
1930-2000,” which is created by Morris A. Davis and Jonathan Heathcote
(2007).11 Every land price index is deflated by the consumption price index
to derive real land prices.
Table A1 in the online appendix provides the Mackinnon approximate
p-values of the Dickey-Fuller test (henceforth, the DF test) under the null
hypothesis of a unit root. The statistics of the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (1992) test (henceforth, the KPSS test) under the null hypothesis of
stationarity are presented in table A1 as well.12 The last column of table
10One exception is Netherlands. Aggregate consumption of that country is unavailable
from 1969 to 1979.
11See footnote 24 of the article by Davis and Heathcote (2007) for more details of the
dataset.
12See Denis Kwiatkowski, Peter C.B. Phillips, Peter Schmidt, and Yongcheol Shin
(1992).
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A1 provides a diagnosis for the stationarity for each variable. See the online
appendix for the discussion about the stationarity tests.
While we judge from the stationarity tests that the first diﬀerences in the
net output of all the 98 countries follow stationary processes, the stationarity
(with or without trend) of the current account cannot be accepted for the
countries labeled “caution” in the diagnosis and cannot be determined for
the countries labeled “mixed.” However, for the inter-temporal budget con-
straint of a country to be satisfied, the country’s current account must follow
a stationary process with or without trend if the first diﬀerence in the net
output follows a stationary process.13 Likewise, if the first diﬀerence in the
net output follows a stationary process, then the first diﬀerence in private
credit must follow a stationary process such that the intertemporal budget
constraints of individuals are satisfied. In other words, from a theoretical
viewpoint, if DZ follows a stationary process (with or without trend), then
the variables, CA and DPC, should be stationary. Because we cannot imag-
ine countries that do not take notice of their budget constraints, we have
good reason to assume that these variables follow stationary processes.
4 Comparison of the United States and Japan
Eq.(2) is used as the first pass to detect the presence of collateral-based
lending. If agents in a country face collateral constraints, there is a positive,
linear relationship between the first diﬀerence in the land price and the lagged
first diﬀerence in the private credit. The anticipation of an increase in the
land price leads to an increase in private credit.
Figure 1 provides scatter plots of Japan’s private credit versus its (real)
land price as an example for this relationship. In all of the panels in figure 1,
the horizontal line shows the first diﬀerence in the land price and the vertical
line shows the lagged first diﬀerence in private credit. Both panel A and
panel B use the land price index of all urban land (DPL1)14 In the panels,
we observe a positive relationship between an increase in the land price and a
lagged increase in private credit as predicted by our model. The data points
of private credit in 2002 and 2003 are extremely small as seen in panel A
and they can be thought of as outliers.15 In panel B, these two outliers are
13This claim is proven by Bharat Trehan and Carl E. Walsh (1991).
14Even though we use the land price index of six major cities (DPL2), we obtain a
similar result.
15The cause of these outliers is probably so-called “internet bubbles,” which burst in
2001.
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eliminated from our sample: we still see the positive relationship.
[Figure 1 around here]
[Figure 2 around here]
We next examine the United States economy. Figure 2 provides a scatter
plot of the United States private credit versus its real land price. In contrast
to Japan’s case, there is a negative relationship between the two variables,
which contradicts the hypothesis of collateral-based lending. This negative
relationship is statistically significant (although we do not report this).
Let us now estimate Eq.(3) to test whether the coeﬃcient of ∆qt is equal
to zero. In all the ordinary least square (OLS) estimations in table 2, the
coeﬃcients of ∆qt are negative and significant for the Japanese economy.
These results are consistent with our model. The absolute values of the
coeﬃcients when we use the land price index of all urban land are much
greater than when we use the land price index of six major cities.
While we obtain the results consistent with collateral-based lending from
the OLS estimations, ∆qt could be an endogenous variable because capital
inflow possibly pushes up the land price. To address the endogeneity prob-
lem, we perform instrumental variable (IV) estimations. We use the lagged
first diﬀerence of private credit as an instrumental variable because if our
model is applicable to a country, the lagged first diﬀerence of private credit
aﬀects the current account only through ∆qt, as seen in Eqs. (1) and (2).16
In columns (3) and (7), only the one-period-lagged first diﬀerence of private
credit is used as an instrumental variable. The coeﬃcients of ∆qt are neg-
ative and significant in both cases. Moreover, the F -values for the tests of
excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions are greater than 10, im-
plying that there are no symptoms of weak instruments in either case. In
columns (4) and (8), we use the one-to-four-period-lagged first diﬀerences of
private credit as instrumental variables. In both cases, the coeﬃcients of ∆qt
are negative and significant as in the other estimations. While the Hansen
tests of overidentifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions
in both cases, the F -value for the test of excluded instruments in the first-
stage regressions in estimation (8) is less than 10, showing the symptom of
weak instruments. However, the p-value of the LM test for the significance
16Our estimation period is truncated in 2001. If we include the data points in 2002 and
2003, the IV estimations are weakly identified, probably because of the outliers of private
credit in 2002 and 2003.
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of the first diﬀerence of the land price, which is robust to weak instruments,
is 0.013 in estimation (8).17
In contrast with Japan, in the OLS estimations for the United States, the
coeﬃcients of ∆qt are negative but insignificant. As in the case of Japan,
we perform the IV estimations. While there is no symptom of weak instru-
ments in estimation (11), the coeﬃcient of ∆qt is insignificant and positive.
Although there is a symptom of weak instruments in estimation (12), the
p-value of the LM test for the significance of the first diﬀerence of the land
price is 0.813. Judging from the results of the United States, a model with
collateral constraints cannot be applied to the United States economy.
[Table 1 around here]
Finally, we estimate Eq. (1). The results of the OLS estimation for Eq.(1)
are reported in table 2. For the Japanese economy, as in the case in which
we use the land price, the coeﬃcients are negative and significant over the
whole estimation period. To examine whether there is a structural change
we conduct the Chow test, finding that after 1983, borrowers in Japan face
collateral constraints, whereas before 1983, borrowers did not face collateral
constraints. For the United States, borrowers never face collateral constraints
over the whole estimation period. We conduct the Chow test for the United
States economy; however, we find no structural changes. One possible reason
for the results of the United States is that the United States financial market
is fully developed and firms often raise funds by direct finance from capital
markets.18
5 Estimation Results
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that the Japanese economy
is collaterally constrained, whereas the United States economy is not collat-
erally constrained. In examining countries other than Japan and the United
States, we encounter a diﬃculty in collecting the data for the land prices.
17See Keith Finlay and Leandro M. Magnusson (2009) for more information on the LM
test.
18One might say that a small-open-economy version of the KM model, where the world
interest rate is exogenously given, is not appropriate for an investigation of the United
States economy. However, the assumption for a small open economy should not be an
obstacle to our analysis. This is because, even though we consider a model in which the
United States is a large country, ∆qt would correlate with ∆PCt−1 in a positive way if
borrowers in the United States faced credit constraints.
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For many countries, the land price data do not exist, and in other countries
where the land price data do exist, the available data points are too few to
be estimated.
In contrast with the land price data, the data for private credit are avail-
able for many countries; therefore, we provide empirical evidence for 98
countries by estimating Eq.(1), which is associated with private credit. Al-
though we can provide only one kind of empirical evidence, if the coeﬃcient
of ∆PCt−1 is negative and significant, then we judge that a collateral-based
lending is established in a country.
Table A2 in the online appendix provides the empirical results. We esti-
mate Eq.(1) both with and without a constant term. We also conduct the
Chow test to investigate a structural change in each country. More con-
cretely, we open a test window from 1970 to 1999 (depending upon the data
availability) and conduct the Chow test for each year. If the F value for the
Chow test is significant for a year and at a maximum compared to the other
years, we regard the year as a breaking point. If the statistical significance of
the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 changes before and after the breaking point, then
we enter the result of the Chow test in table A2. Due to limitations of space,
we discuss only countries indicating distinctive results. See table 2, which is
extracted from table A2 in the online appendix.
[Table 2 around here]
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom economy is collaterally constrained over the whole es-
timation period. However, if we investigate the economy in more detail by
conducting the Chow test, we find that there is a breaking point in 1992. In
1992, the Pound Crisis occurred in the United Kingdom. Before the crisis,
the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is negative and significant, whereas after the cri-
sis, the coeﬃcient is negative but insignificant. However, we may well judge
that the UK economy establishes a collateral-based lending system over the
estimation period overall because the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is negative and
significant for the whole estimation period.
East Asian Countries
There are three countries, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand among East Asian
countries that exhibit distinctive estimation results. The common experience
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of these three countries is that they underwent financial crises in 1997. Inter-
estingly, the consequences of the estimations are similar among these three
countries. It follows from the Chow tests that there is a breaking point in
1998 for the Korean and Malaysian economies. Likewise, there is a breaking
point in 1997 for Thailand’s economy.
As is similar to the UK economy, before the crises, these three countries
are collaterally constrained, whereas after the crises, they are not. Unlike the
UK economy, however, the results do not indicate that they face collateral
constraints over the whole period. Although it must be true that financial
systems of the three countries changed after the crises, the investigations for
each country are beyond the scope of this paper.
Costa Rica and Kenya
Costa Rica and Kenya are interesting cases of our estimations. As can be
observed in table 2, the estimation for the whole period shows that the coef-
ficients of ∆PCt−1 are insignificant in both countries. However, we identify
breaking points for both countries. If we divide the estimation period into
the two sub-periods according to their breaking points, then the coeﬃcients
of ∆PCt−1 in the periods both before and after each breaking point become
significant in both countries. From these two examples, we understand the
importance of identifying a structural change in an economy.
6 The Origin of Collateral-Based Lending
6.1 Index for Collateral-Based Lending
This section investigates our second question, that is, we detect the origin of
the collateral-based lending system. Particularly, we seek an answer to this
question in the legal protection of lenders. Strengthened legal protection re-
laxes credit market imperfections and gives constrained agents opportunities
to borrow more easily in the financial market than when legal protection
is weak (La Porta at al., 1997, 1998; Fabbri and Menichini, 2004). This is
because an improvement of legal protection increases default costs and leads
to the resolution of asymmetric information.
Meanwhile, there is a reason why an improvement of legal protection pro-
motes collateral-based lending in an economy. The length of a judicial process
is one of the legal enforcement costs associated with protection of lenders. If
a trial is very long, lenders face risks of unexpected changes in the value of
14
collateral (Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano, and Magda Bianco, 2005). For in-
stance, suppose that legal protection of lenders is so weak in an economy that
formalism overgrows in justice and trials take long time (Simeon Djankov,
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lop´ez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2003). If
the value of collateral changes during a long trial, the dispute becomes hor-
ribly complicated. Therefore, in an economy with weak legal protection of
lenders, collateral-based lending hardly develops. We demonstrate this hy-
pothesis below.
We have to make decisions about our investigation. We focus on lend-
ing systems in the 1980s and 1990s because by concentrating on these two
decades, we can collect as many samples as possible. If we study the 2000s,
the number of data points of the index for collateral-based lending is signif-
icantly reduced. Similarly, if we study the 1960s and 1970s, the number of
data points of legal protection critically decreases as well. The criterion in
creating the indices is as follows.19
1. If the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 in Eq.(1) is negative and significant at the
5% level for the one-sided test in estimation either with or without
a constant over the whole estimation period, then 1 is assigned to the
indices for both the 1980s and the 1990s. However, as with Belize, if the
estimation period for a country starts with 1986 or later, we eliminate
it from a sample set for the 1980s. Likewise, as with Germany, if the
estimation period for a country ends before 1990, it is eliminated from
a sample set for the 1990s.
2. If the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 in Eq.(1) is not significantly negative, we
proceed to the Chow test in the country. If the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1
is negative and significant at the 5% level for the one-sided test for
more than five years in 1980-1989, then 1 is assigned to the index for
the 1980s. Similarly, if the coeﬃcient is significantly negative for more
than five years in 1990-1999, then 1 is assigned to the index for the
1990s.
3. If neither of the above two steps assigns 1, then we assign 0 to the
indices both for the 1980s and the 1990s.
19Although one might argue that we can use the estimated values of the coeﬃcient of
∆PCt−1 as the index for collateral-based lending, we cannot do this. This is because
CA and ∆Z are not comparable between countries and because our model specifies the
diﬀerent values of coeﬃcients of ∆PCt−1 between countries, for example, depending upon
the land endowments.
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According to the index for collateral-based lending, we report that 47
countries had collateral-based lending systems in the 1980s and 48 countries
had them in the 1990s. While it is diﬃcult to check the robustness of our
indices, our indices are consistent with the microeconomic empirical findings
discussed in the introduction. That is, collateral lending systems are not
established in the United States, Italy, or Mexico, but are established in
Costa Rica, Japan, and Thailand.
Let us now test the origin of collateral-based lending by estimating the
following equation:
Ii = α+ β1Li +Xiβ2 + ²i,
where Ii denotes the index for collateral-based lending of country i, Li is
a measure of the quality of legal protection of lenders, Xi is a set of other
control variables including a measure of urbanization in 1950, financial open-
ness in the 1980s or the 1990s, and a measure of economic development in
1970, and ²i is an error term. Urbanization probably aﬀects lending sys-
tems. Intuitively, as many people come to live in urban areas, information
about borrowers is shared among financial intermediaries. Therefore, they
can easily screen prospective borrowers if urbanization proceeds, and good
borrowers will be more likely to access credit even without collateral. Mean-
while, in an era of financial globalization, external pressure promotes the
restructuring of the domestic financial system. To control for this eﬀect on
collateral-based lending, we incorporate financial openness in the right-hand
side of the estimation equation. Finally, per capita GDP in 1970 is used as
a control variable for the degree of economic development, which probably
aﬀects the lending systems of a country.
In running regressions, we have to care about an endogeneity problem
associated with legal protection. This is because there is a possibility of
a reverse causality such that, if a country employs a collateral-based lend-
ing system, the government arranges the law supporting the collateral-based
lending system. To address this endogeneity problem, we estimate a probit
model with endogenous explanatory variables. In estimating this model, we
use conditional maximum likelihood estimators.20
We adopt legal origins and a measure of human capital as instrumental
variables for legal protection. Legal origin theory advocated by La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998) tells us that when the common or civil law was intro-
duced in a country via conquest or colonization, not only the rules but also
20See Jeﬀrey Marc Wooldridge (2002, pp.472-477) for details.
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human capital and the ideologies of the legal system were transplanted into
the country. The protection of property rights in common law countries is
stronger than in civil law countries. This theory suggests that legal protec-
tion as an institution in a country is aﬀected by legal origins. In addition to
legal origins, we assume that human capital accumulation from 1960 to 1980
or to 1990 positively aﬀects the development of a legal system of a country.
6.2 Data
We use “Chain Area 2” from the database of James D. Gwartney, Joshua
C. Hall, and Robert Lawson (2010) as a measure of legal protection. This
measure reflects the rule of law, security of property rights, an independent
judiciary, and an impartial court system. We collected the indices of 1980 and
of 1990 entered in “Chain Area 2” of the database. For robustness checks
for our results, we use the “rule of law,” assembled from the database of
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010), as a measure
of legal protection as well. This measure is a weighted average of variables,
such as individuals’ perceptions of the eﬀectiveness and predictability of the
judiciary and the enforcement of contracts. We assembled the indices of 1996
and of 1998 entered in the sheet of “rule of law.”
The measure of urbanization was taken from the database produced by
the United Nations (2010), the Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs,
Population Division. We use “Percentage of Population Residing in Urban
Areas” in File 2 of the database of “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009
Revision.” To avoid an endogeneity problem associated with this measure,
we use the index of 1950. As a measure of financial openness, we use the
Chinn-Ito index, which is a de jure measure of capital account openness
index developed by Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito (2008). The Chinn-Ito
index reflects capital control policies and measures the intensity of capital
controls. To produce measures for the financial openness of the 1980s and
1990s, we averaged the data points from 1980 to 1989 and from 1990 to 1999.
Because capital control policies are implemented without targeting specific
lending systems, we regard the Chinn-Ito index as exogenous.
As a measure of economic development in 1970, we collected the real
gross domestic product per capita (current price) in 1970 from the Penn
World Table 6.3, produced by Alan Heston, Roberst Summers, and Bettina
Aten (2009). The data for legal origins were gathered from Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lop´ez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1999).
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As a measure of human capital, we assembled the data for “Average Year
of Total Schooling” as in 1960 from the full dataset of “Population Aged 25
and Over” produced by Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2010). The
“European settler mortality” rates were collected from Daron Acemoglu, Si-
mon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001). These mortality rates are of
soldiers, bishops, and sailors who settled in colonies from the seventeen to
nineteenth centuries.
6.3 Results
Table 3 reports the results of the probit estimation without instrumental
variables. All the regressions in the table indicate that the coeﬃcients of
legal protection in 1980s and in 1990s are positive and significant at the
conventional significance level. This implies that good legal protection pro-
motes a collateral-based lending system. In other words, if an economy is
endowed with good legal protection of lenders, they can access credit as long
as borrowers hold collateral.
In most regressions, the coeﬃcients of urbanization are negative and sig-
nificant. This consequence may be caused by most people coming to live in
urban areas, in which case information about borrowers is commonly used
by financial intermediaries. As a result, these financial intermediaries can
easily screen prospective borrowers from a pool of potential borrowers. As
urbanization proceeds, prospective borrowers will access credit even with-
out collateral. Financial openness seems to negatively aﬀect collateral-based
lending; however, this relationship is not significant. The degree of develop-
ment does not enter significantly in any of the regressions, although it seems
to positively aﬀect collateral-based lending.
[Table 3 around here]
The results of table 3 might be subject to an endogeneity problem. This
is because if an economy exhibits a germ of collateral-based lending, the
government may try to support the lending system by enacting laws that
accommodate the system. Therefore, we also estimate a probit model with
endogenous explanatory variables. For the estimation, the instrumental vari-
ables are the legal origins and the average years of total schooling in 1960
(School 60, henceforth), which is a proxy for human capital in 1980s and
1990s.
[Table 4 around here]
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Table 4 reports the results of probit estimation with instrumental vari-
ables. It provides similar results to those in table 3, except for the insignif-
icance of legal protection in column (8). This implies that the results of
table 3 are robust. For the validity of instrumental variables, the J tests of
overidentifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions in all
estimations.21 The F -values for the tests of excluded instruments in the first-
stage regressions are greater than 10 for four cases out of eight, implying that
in those four cases there are no symptoms of weak instruments.22 Therefore,
for these four cases, the instruments are considered to be valid. Although
the F -values for the tests of excluded instruments in the first-stage regres-
sions are less than 10, the LM tests, which are robust to weak instruments,
indicate the significance of the coeﬃcients of legal protection, except for the
estimation in columns (7) and (8).
We infer from our estimation that good legal protection of lenders is an
important institutional factor for an economy to establish a collateral-based
lending system. Our estimation also indicates that urbanization weakens a
collateral-based lending system.
6.4 Robustness
6.4.1 European Settler Mortality as an Instrument
A simultaneous equation model is sometimes sensitive to the choice of instru-
mental variables. For a robustness check, we also use the “European settler
mortality” rate of Acemoglu et al. (2001) as an instrumental variable for
legal protection. They propose a theory of institutional diﬀerences among
countries colonized by Europeans. According to their theory, diﬀerent colo-
nization policies created diﬀerent institutions. The feasibility of settlement
of colonized places determined the colonization strategy. For instance, if dis-
ease in a location undermined European settlement, Europeans did not settle
in that place. Instead, they were more likely to form an extractive system in
those places. By contrast, if European settlers did not encounter significant
disease-related impediments, they transplanted good institutions protecting
property rights into these places. In these cases, the colonial state and insti-
tutions continue up to the present day. This theory supports use of the early
mortality rate as an instrumental variable for the legal protection of lenders.
21See Keith Finlay and Leandro M. Magnusson (2009) for more information on the J
test.
22The F -values greater than 10 satisfy the “rule of thumb” proposed by Douglas Staiger
and James H. Stock (1997).
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The number of countries for which we can obtain the data for “European
settler mortality” is limited, and our observations are at most 52. As seen
in table 5, the estimation results are similar to those of table 3. Although
all the F -values for the tests of excluded instruments are less than 10, the
Anderson-Rubin (AR) tests for the significance of an endogenous variable,
which are robust to weak instruments, report that legal protection enters
significantly in all cases.
[Table 5 around here]
6.4.2 Another Measure of Legal Protection
We use another measure of legal protection of lenders, which is the “rule of
law” created by Kaufmann et al. (2010). Unfortunately, the “rule of law” is
available only from 1996 onward. Therefore, our estimation focuses only on
the 1990s. We assembled the data for the “rule of law” of 1996 and 1998.
Table 6 indicates that all of the coeﬃcients of legal protection except for
one case are positive and significant at the conventional significance level.
The signs of the coeﬃcients and the significance of urbanization are almost
the same as those of the previous regressions. All the F -values for the tests
of excluded instruments are greater than 10, implying that there are no
symptoms of weak instruments. The J tests do not reject the orthogonality
conditions in any of the regressions.
[Table 6 around here]
7 Concluding Remarks
We have used a small-open-economy version of Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John
Moore’s model to judge whether a collateral-based lending system is embed-
ded in an economy. If Kiyotaki and Moore’s model is statistically accepted in
a country, we consider that the country establishes a collateral-based lending
system. From our estimation, we find that collateral-based lending systems
are embedded in approximately half of the 98 countries.
This paper could be a caveat against the reckless use of a model with col-
lateral constraints. Researchers often presume collateral constraints when in-
vestigating macroeconomic phenomena. However, if a collateral-based lend-
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ing system is not established in an economy, we may deduce inadequate policy
implications from a theoretical model with collateral constraints.
Moreover, we have investigated the origin of collateral-based lending sys-
tems. We find that the legal protection of lenders supports the establish-
ment of collateral-based lending systems. This result is robust without being
subject to an endogeneity problem associated with the legal protection of
lenders. We also find that urbanization negatively aﬀects the establishment
of collateral-based lending systems. This is possibly because if people come
to live in urban areas, information about borrowers is commonly used by
financial intermediaries and thus can easily screen potential borrowers. Con-
sequently, prospective borrowers will access credit, even without collateral.
Of course, this is a possible hypothesis, and we need a more elaborate analysis
on this issue.
Appendix
Model
A country is assumed to be a small open economy facing a world interest rate.
The economy consists of savers and borrowers. Borrowers are collaterally
constrained. The total population in the economy is normalized to one and
the ratio of borrowers to savers is λ:1 − λ, where λ ≥ 0 is a constant. Each
borrower is identical in the sense that he/she has the same preference and
the same technology. Likewise, each saver is identical in the same sense.
Each borrower is endowed with a linear production technology, yt+1 = axt,
whose input is land. Here, a, xt, and yt+1 represent a constant productivity
parameter, land held by a borrower at time t, and his/her output at time
t + 1, respectively. While a borrower borrows resources from the financial
market, he/she faces a credit constraint associated with the value of collateral
at each time.
Each saver is endowed with two kinds of production technologies. While
the two production technologies create the same output, their inputs are
diﬀerent. One uses land x∗t as input:
G1(x
∗
t ),
where G01 > 0 and G
00
1 < 0. G1 satisfies Inada conditions: limx∗→0G
0
1(.) =∞,
limx∗→∞G
0
1(.) = 0 and G1(0) = 0. The other technology uses capital k
∗
t as
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input:
G2(k
∗
t ),
where G02 > 0 and G
00
2 < 0. G2 satisfies Inada conditions as well. Follow-
ing Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), technical conditions on the parameters are
imposed:
a > Rβa > G01((1− Rβ)X¯/(1− λ)), (4)
where X¯ is the total amount of land and R > 1 is the world interest rate,
which is exogenously given.23 β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount rate, which
is common between borrowers and savers. By Eq.(4), we exclude economi-
cally meaningless solutions of the model. Because each saver is endowed with
the two kinds of technologies, his output at time t+ 1 is given by:
y∗t+1 = G1(x
∗
t ) +G2(k
∗
t ).
The instantaneous utility functions of both types of agents are assumed
to be identical; specifically, these are given by ln ct + ln gt and ln c
∗
t + ln gt
where c and c∗ are the consumption of a borrower and a saver, respectively. g
is the total government expenditure, which is exogenously determined by the
government; accordingly, we can omit ln g from the maximization problems
of agents.
A borrower maximizes his lifetime utility as follows:
max
∞X
t=0
βt ln ct (5)
s.t. ct + qt(xt − xt−1) + Rbt−1 = (1− τ)axt−1 + bt, (6)
bt ≤ R−1qt+1xt, (7)
where Eqs.(6) and (7) are the flow budget constraint and the credit con-
straint, respectively. b is debt if positive or savings if negative, q is the land
price, and τ is the tax rate imposed on the output. The online appendix
proves that there exists time T , such that from time T onward, credit con-
straints given by Eq.(7) are always binding. Henceforth, we focus on a case
where the credit constraints are always binding.
23For simplicity, it has been assumed that each borrower is endowed with only one
production technology, whose input is land. One could imagine that while each borrower
can access another production technology as savers, which is linear with respect to capital,
this productivity is extremely low compared with the world interest rate.
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The first-order conditions for a borrower are given by:
1
ct
− βR 1
ct+1
− φt = 0 (8)
−qt
ct
+ β[(1− τ)a+ qt+1] 1
ct+1
+ R−1qt+1φt = 0, (9)
where φt is a co-state variable of the credit constraint at time t. The
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the optimality of this maximization
problem consist of Eqs.(8) and (9) as well as the transversality conditions,
limt→∞R
−tbt=limt→∞ = βt(qtxt/ct) = 0.
Likewise, a saver’s maximization problem is given by:
max
∞X
t=0
βt ln c∗t (10)
s.t. c∗t + qt(x
∗
t − x∗t−1) + I∗t + Rb∗t−1
= (1− τ)[G1(x∗t−1) +G2(k∗t−1)] + b∗t , (11)
where I∗t = k
∗
t − (1− δ)k∗t−1.
The first-order conditions for a saver are given by:
c∗t+1 = βRc∗t (12)
(1− τ)G01(x∗t )
ut
= R (13)
(1− τ)G02(k∗t ) = R + δ − 1, (14)
where ut = qt − qt+1/R. Eq.(12) is the Euler equation, and Eq.(13) and
Eq.(14) are the intra-temporal optimality conditions in the land market and
in the capital market, respectively.24 The necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the optimality of this maximization problem consist of Eqs.(12)-(14) as
well as the transversality conditions, limt→∞R
−tb∗t=limt→∞ = βt(qtx∗t/c∗t ) =
0.
Because Eq.(7) is binding, the budget constraint of a borrower, Eq.(6), is
reduced to:
ct + utxt = (1− τ)axt−1. (15)
24To be accurate, to ensure that all the savers remain savers over their lifetimes, the
assets held by savers in the steady state, −bˆ∗, must be greater than zero. As seen in the
later, −bˆ∗ is given by −bˆ∗=[δkˆ∗−(1−τ )(G1(xˆ∗)+G2(kˆ∗))]/(R−1), where xˆ∗ = G0−11 (Rβa)
and kˆ∗ = G0−12 ((R+ δ − 1)/(1− τ)) are the land and capital stocks held by a saver in the
steady state, respectively. We impose the parameter conditions so that −bˆ∗ > 0.
23
From Eqs.(8) and (9), we obtain a new Euler equation:
ct+1 =
(1− τ)aβ
ut
ct. (16)
From Eqs.(15) and (16), the optimal consumption is obtained as follows:
ct = (1− β)[(1− τ)axt−1 + qtxt−1 −Rbt−1] = (1− β)(1− τ)axt−1. (17)
From Eqs.(13), (15), and (17), we obtain a dynamical system with respect
to xt as follows:
G01
³X¯ − λxt
1− λ
´
xt = Rβaxt−1.
Because Rβa > G01(X¯/(1 − λ)), this dynamical system has a unique non-
trivial steady state xˆ, which is an inner point. The steady sate is stable be-
cause the linear approximation of the dynamical system is xt−xˆ= βRaβRa− λ
1−λ Gˆ
00
1 xˆ
(xt−1−
xˆ), where | βRaβRa− λ
1−λ Gˆ
00
1 xˆ
| < 1. Additionally, it can be shown that the equilib-
rium sequences of all variables converging to their steady states satisfy the
transversality conditions.25
Because the lifetime utility is log-linear, the consumption function of a
saver is derived as follows:
c∗t = (1− β)[(1− τ)y∗t − I∗t + qtx∗t−1 −Rb∗t−1 +
∞X
j=0
R−jπt+j], (18)
where πt = (1/R)((1− τ)y∗t+1 − I∗t+1)− utx∗t .
To derive the current account dynamics, we aggregate the consumption
functions for all the agents. From Eqs.(17) and (18), the aggregate consump-
tion function is given by:
Ct = (1− β)[Zt + qtX¯ + RFt−1 + (1− λ)
∞X
j=0
R−jπt+j], (19)
where Ct = λct + (1 − λ)c∗t , Zt = (1 − τ)[λyt + (1 − λ)y∗t ] − (1 − λ)I∗t , and
Ft−1 = −(λbt−1+(1−λ)b∗t−1). Here, we note that Ft−1 is the net foreign asset
held by the country at time t− 1. The first diﬀerence of Eq.(19) is obtained
as follows:
∆Ct = (1− β)[∆Zt +∆qtX¯ + R∆Ft−1 + (1− λ)
∞X
j=0
R−j∆πt+j ]. (20)
25While it is complicated to investigate the equilibrium sequence {qt}, it can be shown
that {qt} converges to qˆ = a(1−τ)R−1 .
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By linearizing
P∞
j=0R
−j∆πt+j around the steady state, we haveP∞j=0R−j∆πt+j =
−xˆ∗∆qt where xˆ∗ is the land held by a saver in the steady state. By using
this equation, Eq.(20) is reduced to:
∆Ct = (1− β)[∆Zt + (X¯ − (1− λ)xˆ∗)∆qt + R∆Ft−1]. (21)
Meanwhile, it follows from the national income identity that:26
CAt = RCAt−1 +∆Zt −∆Ct, (22)
where CAt = ∆Ft is the current account at time t. From Eqs.(21) and (22),
we obtain a dynamic equation for the current account:
CAt = βR CAt−1 + β∆Zt − (1− β)(X¯ − (1− λ)xˆ∗)∆qt. (23)
The closed-form expression of Eq.(23) is the same as the one Kunieda and
Shibata (2005) derive.
Linearinzing Rbt = qt+1xt around the steady sate, we have:
R(bt − bˆ) = xˆ(qt+1 − qˆ) + qˆ(xt − xˆ).
By taking the first diﬀerence of this equation, it follows that:
R∆bt = xˆ∆qt+1 + qˆ∆xt. (24)
Because X¯ = λxt + (1− λ)x∗t , Eq.(23) becomes:
CAt = βRCAt−1 + β∆Zt − (1− β)λxˆ∆qt. (25)
Because we have xt − xˆ = Φ(xt−1 − xˆ) around the steady state where Φ :=
βRa
βRa− λ
1−λ Gˆ
00
1 xˆ
, it follows that
∆xt = Φ∆xt−1
and thus:
∆xt = Φt−1∆x1. (26)
From Eq.(13), we have (1− τ)G01( X¯−λxt1−λ ) = Rqt− qt+1, which is expanded
around the steady state as follows:
−λ(1− τ)
1− λ Gˆ
00
1(xt − xˆ) = R(qt − qˆ)− (qt+1 − qˆ),
26We should note that the national income identity is Zt +RFt−1 = Ft + Ct.
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where Gˆ001 = G
00
1(xˆ
∗). From this, we obtain:
∆qt+1 = R∆qt + λ(1− τ)
1− λ Gˆ
00
1∆xt. (27)
By substituting Eq.(26) into Eq.(27), we have:
∆qt+1 = R∆qt + λ(1− τ)
1− λ Gˆ
00
1Φt−1∆x1. (28)
The solution for Eq.(28) is given by:
∆qt = (∆q1Φ − λΦ˜)ΦR
t−1 + λΦ˜Φt, (29)
where Φ˜ = (1−τ)Gˆ001∆x1
(1−λ)(Φ2−RΦ) . It must hold that ∆q1 = λΦ˜Φ so that the transver-
sality conditions can be satisfied. Therefore, we obtain:
∆qt = λΦ˜Φt. (30)
From Eqs.(26) and (30), we have ∆xt = ∆x1λΦ˜Φ2∆qt+1. From the last equation
and Eq.(24), we obtain the following:
xˆ∆qt+1 = RλΦ˜Φ
2xˆ
λΦ˜Φ2xˆ+ qˆ∆x1∆bt. (31)
Substituting Eq.(31) into Eq.(25), we have:
CAt = βRCAt−1 + β∆Zt − (1− β)λ2Ψxˆ∆bt−1, (32)
where Ψ := RΦ˜Φ2λΦ˜Φ2xˆ+qˆ∆x1 . Because the increase in loans to borrowers con-
tributes to the increase in the aggregate private credit, we have λ∆bt :=
∆PCt. By substituting the last into (32), we obtain:
CAt = βRCAt−1 + β∆Zt − (1− β)Ψλxˆ∆PCt−1. (33)
From Eq.(31), we have:
∆qt+1 = Ψ∆PCt. (34)
As seen in Eq.(33), if there are no collaterally constrained agents, i.e., λ =
0, then the eﬀect of ∆PCt−1 on the current account degenerates. Eq.(33) can
be used to examine whether a theoretical model with collateral constraints
is applicable to an economy.
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Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Figure 1   Land Price versus Private Credit (Japan) 
 
Notes. The horizontal axes show the first difference in the land price and the vertical axes show the 
lagged first difference in private credit. In the Japanese economy, the relationship between the first 
difference in land price and the lagged first difference in private credit is consistent with Kiyotaki 
and Moore’s (1997) model. In both Panel A and Panel B, we use the land price index of all urban land 
(DPL1). The outliers of 2002 and 2003 are eliminated from the sample in Panel B. 
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Figure 2   Land Price versus Private Credit (USA) 
 
The horizontal axis shows the first difference in the land price and the vertical axis 
shows the lagged first difference in private credit. In the US economy, the relationship 
between the first difference in land price and the lagged first difference in private credit 
is not consistent with Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model. 
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country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
United Kingdom 1962-2007 (46) 0.623a -0.089a 0.217 -2.054 0.737
1992 (0.097) (0.024) (0.144) (1.515)
[0.0372] 1962-1991 (30) 0.572a -0.143a 0.421a -2.038 0.859
(0.093) (0.023) (0.012) (1.310)
1992-2007 (16) 0.573a -0.018 0.167 -7.034 0.443
(0.093) (0.037) (0.193) (5.427)
1962-2007 (46) 0.633a -0.097a 0.126 0.811
(0.100) (0.023) (0.114)
1962-1991 (30) 0.577a -0.151a 0.315a 0.868
(0.099) (0.025) (0.105)
1992-2007 (16) 0.691a -0.040 0.076 0.815
(0.247) (0.035) (0.202)
Japan 1962-2007 (46) 0.997a -0.016a 0.275a -700 0.879
1983 (0.055) (0.004) (0.088) (876)
[0.0016] 1962-1982 (21) 0.025 0.040 0.413a -1958b 0.649
(0.250) (0.035) (0.086) (853)
1983-2007 (35) 0.947a -0.015a 0.337b 133 0.709
(0.183) (0.005) (0.197) (3193)
1962-2007 (46) 0.965a -0.016a 0.218a 0.946
(0.040) (0.004) (0.046)
1962-1982 (21) 0.195 -0.008 0.269a 0.629
(0.240) (0.027) (0.051)
1983-2007 (35) 0.954a -0.015a 0.343a 0.974
(0.045) (0.005) (0.087)
USA 1962-2007 (46) 0.996a 0.023 -0.165 -1.482 0.903
(0.077) (0.026) (0.158) (13.6)
1962-2007 (46) 0.996a 0.023 -0.174 0.942
(0.076) (0.026) (0.104)
Korea 1973-2007 (35) 0.686a 0.042 0.623b -6026b 0.522
1998 (0.096) (0.088) (0.280) (2854)
 [0.0000] 1973-1997 (25) 0.850a -0.264a 0.923a -3972a 0.823
(0.139) (0.042) (0.131) (1275)
1998-2007 (10) -0.149 0.213 0.385 16944 0.563
(0.254) (0.083) (0.568) (10386)
1973-2007 (35) 0.626a 0.019 0.307b 0.510
(0.101) (0.082) (0.129)
1973-1997 (25) 0.880a -0.289a 0.739a 0.771
(0.139) (0.044) (0.101)
1998-2007 (10) 0.192 0.232 1.030a 0.854
(0.187) (0.090) (0.378)
Notes.  The dependent variable is the current account. If the coefficient of DPC(-1) is positive and significant, then a
collateral-based lending system is embedded in the country. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, and c
indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels for the one-sided test, respectively. The breaking years of the Chow test
are under country names (if any), and the values in square brackets are the p-values of the test .
Table 2 OLS Estimation (The Current Account/Private Credit)
Estimation periods (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Costta Rica 1962-2001 (40) 0.890a -0.204 0.085b -26.8b 0.786
1987 (0.075) (0.156) (0.037) (11.0)
 [0.0000] 1962-1986 (25) 0.963a -0.695a 0.422a -17.5b 0.919
(0.050) (0.167) (0.097) (8.318)
1987-2001 (15) -0.082 -0.382b 0.038 -248a 0.414
(0.212) (0.182) (0.034) (39.5)
1962-2001 (40) 1.052a -0.099 0.142a 0.955
(0.058) (0.167) (0.054)
1962-1986 (25) 1.057a -0.771a 0.378a 0.973
(0.046) (0.180) (0.093)
1987-2001 (15) 1.100a 0.035 0.096b 0.950
(0.086) (0.222) (0.053)
Kenya 1966-2006 (41) 0.655a -0.879 -0.235 -22100 0.578
1994 (0.185) (0.561) (0.338) (12102)
 [0.0000] 1966-1993 (28) 0.561a -1.640a 0.305a -12083 0.686
(0.110) (0.525) (0.104) (5985)
1994-2006 (13) 0.355 -1.465b -0.513 -87059 0.680
(0.354) (0.723) (0.204) (39084)
1966-2006 (41) 0.806a -0.895 -0.271 0.792
(0.128) (0.705) (0.349)
1966-1993 (28) 0.700a -1.929a 0.303a 0.899
(0.088) (0.542) (0.114)
1994-2006 (13) 0.837a 0.178 -0.904 0.863
(0.175) (0.511) (0.246)
Malaysia 1962-2007 (46) 0.862a 0.069 0.885a -4145a 0.953
1998 (0.062) (0.115) (0.218) (1255)
 [0.0000] 1962-1997 (26) 0.895a -0.121a 0.717a -2037a 0.795
(0.124) (0.029) (0.163) (830)
1998-2007 (20) 0.789a 0.466 0.464b 3631 0.953
(0.070) (0.151) (0.193) (3963)
1962-2007 (46) 0.847a 0.006 0.789a 0.949
(0.072) (0.113) (0.235)
1962-1997 (26) 0.867a -0.162a 0.589a 0.787
(0.148) (0.030) (0.136)
1998-2007 (20) 0.823a 0.476 0.523b 0.993
(0.047) (0.130) (0.209)
Thailand 1968-2007 (40) 0.828a -0.082 1.042a -86.5a 0.842
1997 (0.142) (0.071) (0.185) (15.3)
 [0.0029] 1968-1996 (29) 0.577a -0.237a 0.576a -52.1a 0.927
(0.152) (0.060) (0.142) (16.7)
1997-2007 (11) 0.891a 0.035 1.101a -86.7 0.633
(0.258) (0.117) (0.304) (72.5)
1968-2007 (40) 0.751a -0.116 0.672a 0.756
(0.151) (0.088) (0.168)
1968-1996 (29) 0.841a -0.187a 0.372a 0.935
(0.132) (0.068) (0.129)
1997-2007 (11) 0.687a 0.001 0.852a 0.842)
(0.189) (0.110) (0.188)
Table 2 (Continued)
Estimation periods (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Legal protection 80 0.322a 0.338a 0.308a 0.320a
(0.091) (0.098) (0.091) (0.095)
Legal protection 90 0.207a 0.243a 0.159c 0.195b
(0.076) (0.088) (0.084) (0.089)
Urban 50 -0.024a -0.022b -0.026b -0.025c -0.011c -0.008 -0.021b -0.019b
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Financial openness 80 -0.055 -0.051
(0.145) (0.147)
Financial openness 90 -0.127 -1.172
(0.153) (0.175)
Log of GDP per capita 70 0.096 0.137 0.372 0.470
(0.329) (0.347) (0.280) (0.311)
Constant -0.742c -0.896c -1.275 -1.654 -0.826b -1.106b -2.825c -3.725c
(0.444) (0.517) (1.951) (2.095) (0.390) (0.492) (1.610) (1.938)
P-value of the Wald test 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.024 0.079 0.033 0.056
Observations 65 62 65 62 80 78 80 78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Legal protection 80 0.463a 0.487a 0.513a 0.519a
(0.138) (0.149) (0.147) (0.192)
Legal protection 90 0.314a 0.348b 0.289c 0.275
(0.109) (0.148) (0.157) (0.186)
Urban 50 -0.034a -0.031a -0.030b -0.028b -0.019b -0.012 -0.022b -0.020b
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Financial openness 80 -0.108 -0.116
(0.149) (0.148)
Financial openness 90 -0.220 -0.224
(0.183) (0.193)
Log of GDP per capita 70 -0.216 -0.136 0.126 0.357
(0.409) (0.416) (0.381) (0.370)
Constant -1.152b -1.405b -0.034 -0.708 -1.163b -1.512b -1.804 -3.335c
(0.580) (0.690) (2.227) (2.288) (0.519) (0.756) (1.901) (1.992)
First stage F statistic 27.5 8.05 10.2 4.05 21.14 16.18 8.17 7.83
LM test p=0.012 p=0.020 p=0.026 p=0.042 p=0.017 p=0.036 p=0.113 p=0.171
J test p=0.695 p=0.490 p=0.766 p=0.529 p=0.652 p=0.579 p=0.665 p=0.660
Observations 64 61 64 61 78 76 78 78
Table 4 Probit Estimation with Instruments 
Collateral based lending 80 Collateral based lending 90
Notes. The dependent variable is an index for collateral-based lending. The conditional maximum-likelihood
estimators are used. Instrumental variables are legal origin (France, Germany, and Scandinavians) and School 60.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels for the two-
sided test, respectively. The first-stage F statistic is for a test of excluded instrumental variables in the first-satge
regressions. The LM test for the significance of an endogenous variable is robust to weak instruments. The J test is
a test of the overidentifying restrictions. ``p=" is the p-value for a test.
Table 3 Probit Estimation
Collateral based lending 80 Collateral based lending 90
Notes. The dependent variable is an index for collateral-based lending. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a, b, and c indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels for the two-sided test, respectively. The null hypothesis
of the Wald test is that all the coefficients are zero.
Legal protection 80 0.745a 0.781a 0.747a 0.785a
(0.070) (0.073) (0.067) (0.069)
Legal protection 90 0.660a 0.696a 0.676a 0.705a
(0.066) (0.065) (0.060) (0.068)
Urban 50 -0.051a -0.044a -0.046a -0.036b -0.032a -0.022a -0.017c -0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Financial openness 80 -0.263 -0.277
(0.188) (0.179)
Financial openness 90 -0.411b -0.374b
(0.182) (0.169)
Log of GDP per capita 70 -0.181 -0.274 -0.626b -0.630b
(0.422) (0.424) (0.288) (0.264)
Constant -2.190a -2.651a -1.126 -1.065 -2.436a -2.902a 1.230 0.849
(0.367) (0.530) (2.518) (2.522) (0.335) (0.430) (1.812) (1.623)
First stage F statistic 6.87 6.19 4.35 3.56 3.52 1.19 0.87 0.10
AR test p=0.005 p=0.006 p=0.007 p=0.008 p=0.001 p=0.001 p=0.003 p=0.003
Observations 42 42 42 42 52 52 52 52
Legal protection 96 0.778a 0.677b 0.711b 0.537
(0.274) (0.307) (0.350) (0.373)
Legal protection 98 0.784a 0.836b 0.758b 0.718c
(0.279) (0.339) (0.387) (0.413)
Urban 50 -0.020b -0.016c -0.029b -0.021b -0.021b -0.016 -0.022b -0.020b
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Financial openness 80 -0.027 -0.038
(0.116) (0.125)
Financial openness 90 -0.157 -0.191
(0.145) (0.163)
Log of GDP per capita 70 0.140 0.286 0.043 0.262
(0.307) (0.309) (0.340) (0.351)
Constant 0.429 0.308 -0.446 -1.493 0.497 0.387 0.222 -1.282
(0.285) (0.299) (1.989) (2.000) (0.314) (0.332) (2.280) (2.357)
First stage F statistic 21.84 20.32 11.32 10.59 24.10 16.25 10.26 10.15
LM test p=0.013 p=0.041 p=0.062 p=0.161 p=0.015 p=0.027 p=0.073 p=0.106
J test p=0.820 p=0.918 p=0.822 p=0.930 p=0.757 p=0.687 p=0.757 p=0.744
Observations 85 80 85 80 85 83 85 83
Collateral based lending 90 Collateral based lending 90
Notes. The dependent variable is an index for collateral-based lending. The conditional maximum-likelihood
estimators are used. Instrumental variables are legal origin (France, Germany, and Scandinavians) and School 60.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels for the two-
sided test, respectively. The first stage F statistic is for a test of excluded instrumental variables in the first satge
regressions. The LM test for the significance of an endogenous variable is robust to weak instruments. The J test
is a test of the overidentifying restrictions. ``p=" is the p-value for a test.
Table 5 Probit Estimation with Instruments 
Collateral based lending 80 Collateral based lending 90
Notes. The dependent variable is an index for collateral-based lending. The conditional maximum-likelihood
estimators are used. The mortality rate of settlers is used as an instrumental variable. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. a, b, and c indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels for the two-sided test, respectively. The
first stage F statistic is for a test of excluded instrumental variables in the first-satge regressions. The Anderson-
Rubin (AR) test for the significance of an endogenous variable is robust to weak instruments. ``p=" is the p-value
for a test.
Table 6 Probit Estimation with Instruments 
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Binding Credit Constraint
The claim that there exists T such that from time T onwards, Eq.(7) is
always binding is proven taking two steps. Step 1 claims that each borrower
faces credit constraints at least once over his lifetime. Step 2 claims that if a
borrower faces a credit constraint at time T , then the credit constraints are
binding from T onward.
First, step 1 is proven by contradiction. Suppose that Eq.(7) is never
binding. Then φt = 0 for all t, and thus the Euler equation for a borrower
becomes:
ct+1 = βRct, (35)
and the dynamic equation for the land price is given by:
qt+1 = Rqt − a(1− τ). (36)
From Eq.(36) and the transversality condition, qt must be constant for all
t ≥ 0 and is given by:
qt =
a(1− τ)
R − 1 .
From this, Eq.(13) is reduced to:
G01(x
∗
t ) = a,
which implies that xt and x
∗
t become constant as well. Then the budget
constraint (6) becomes:
ct + Rbt−1 = a(1− τ)x˜+ bt, (37)
where x˜ := X¯/λ− (1− λ)G0−11 (a)/λ. From Eqs.(27), (29) and the transver-
sality condition, we can obtain the dynamics of bt as follows:
bt =
βc0
β − 1(βR)
t +
a(1− τ)x˜
R− 1 ,
where c0 is the initial value of consumption. Because β < 1 and Rβ < 1, bt is
increasing and converges to a(1−τ)x˜/(R−1). However, this is a contradiction
1
because the right-hand side of Eq.(7) is equal to a(1 − τ)x˜/R(R − 1) <
a(1− τ)x˜/(R − 1).
Next, we will show step 2. Suppose that the claim of step 2 does not
hold. More concretely, suppose that Eq.(7) is not binding at time t when it
is binding at time t − 1. In this case, we have the Euler equations at time
t− 1 and t, respectively, as follows:
ct =
(1− τ)aβ
ut−1
ct−1 (38)
ct+1 = βRct, (39)
which implies that ut becomes constant and is given by u˜ := (1−τ)a/R. From
Eq.(13), x∗t and xt become constant as well and are given by x˜
∗ := G0−11 (a)
and x˜ := X¯/λ− (1− λ)G0−11 (a)/λ, respectively.
Because the first equality of Eq.(17) holds whether Eq.(7) is binding or
not, it follows from Eq.(17), Eq.(39) and qt+1 = Rqt − (1 − τ)a that bt =
qtx˜− βa(1− τ)xt−1. From the last, however, we have:
Rbt − qt+1x˜ = (1− τ)a/λ(λx˜− βRλxt−1)
> (1− τ)a/λ(λx˜− βRX¯)
= (1− τ)(1− λ)a/λ((1− βR)X¯/(1− λ)−G0−11 (a)) > 0,
where the last inequality comes from Eq.(4). This is a contradiction. From
mathematical induction, we have a desired conclusion. ¤
Tests for the Stationarity
In the diagnosis for the stationarity tests in table A1 in the unpublished
appendix, “pass” means that the hypothesis of no unit root is accepted both
by the DF test without trend and by the KPSS test without trend, or both
by the DF test with trend and by the KPSS test with trend. “Mixed” means
that the hypothesis of no unit root is accepted either by the DF test without
trend or by the KPSS test without trend, or either by the DF test with trend
or by the KPSS test with trend. “Caution” means that none of the tests
accepts the hypothesis of no unit root.
Because we cannot discuss the results for the stationarity tests country
by country due to space constraints, we briefly comment on the results in
order. First, for the first diﬀerence in the net output, 91 cases out of 98 cases
are labeled “pass,” while seven cases are labeled “mixed.” However, for six
2
out of these seven “mixed” cases, the DF test with trend or without trend
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 0.1% significance level. Then
we judge that the first diﬀerences in the net output of these countries follow
stationary processes with or without trend. For Central Africa, which is the
last case, the p-value for the DF test without trend is 8%, and neither the
KPSS test with trend nor the one without trend rejects the null hypothesis of
no unit root. Then, we also judge that the first diﬀerence in the net output
of Central Africa follows a stationary process.
For the first diﬀerence in private credit, 24 cases out of 98 cases are labeled
“pass,” 73 cases are labeled “mixed,” and one case is labeled “caution.” The
one “caution” case is that of India. Due to industrialization, the private
credit of India has increases since the late 1990s. The non-stationarity of the
first diﬀerence in private credit is caused by this boost. India might have
experienced a structural change for the process of its private credit in the
late 1990s. If a time series includes a structural change, the DF test hardly
rejects the null hypothesis.
The stationarity of the first diﬀerences in private credit for the 73 “mixed”
cases cannot be determined. However, if the first diﬀerence in private credit
follows a unit root process and the first diﬀerence in the net output is sta-
tionary in a country, then the inter-temporal budget constraints of agents
in the country do not hold. Therefore, we reasonably assume that the first
diﬀerence in private credit follows a stationary process.
For the current account, 16 cases out of 98 cases are labeled “pass,” 75
cases are labeled “mixed,” and six cases are labeled “caution.” These six
“caution” cases are those of Algeria, Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mada-
gascar, and Malaysia. These six countries are categorized into two groups.
One is a group for which the current account suddenly started to increase in
the mid 1990s, and the other is a group for which the current account sud-
denly started to decrease in the mid 1990s. The first group includes Algeria
and Malaysia and the second group consists of Grenada, Honduras, Jamaica,
and Madagascar. Due to the structural change for the current account, the
null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be accepted. The phenomena appear-
ing in these six countries have likely been the result of financial globalization
since the mid 1990s.
The stationarity (with or without trend) of the current account cannot be
accepted in the “caution” countries and cannot be determined in the “mixed”
countries. However, for the inter-temporal budget constraint of a country to
be satisfied, the country’s current account must follow a stationary process
3
with or without trend. The current account should be adjusted in the future
so that the feasibility condition in a country holds.
In sum, from a theoretical viewpoint, if DZ follows a stationary process
(with or without trend), then the variables, CA and DPC, must follow
stationary processes.
Tables
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country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
United Kingdom 1962-2007 (46) 0.623a -0.089a 0.217 -2.054 0.737
1992 (0.097) (0.024) (0.144) (1.515)
[0.0372] 1962-1991 (30) 0.572a -0.143a 0.421a -2.038 0.859
(0.093) (0.023) (0.012) (1.310)
1992-2007 (16) 0.573a -0.018 0.167 -7.034 0.443
(0.093) (0.037) (0.193) (5.427)
1962-2007 (46) 0.633a -0.097a 0.126 0.811
(0.100) (0.023) (0.114)
1962-1991 (30) 0.577a -0.151a 0.315a 0.868
(0.099) (0.025) (0.105)
1992-2007 (16) 0.691a -0.040 0.076 0.815
(0.247) (0.035) (0.202)
Greece 1962-2001 (40) 0.749a -0.356 0.731 -950a 0.762
1995 (0.009) (0.226) (0.195) (270)
 [0.0001] 1962-1994 (33) 0.843a -0.328b 0.039 -384b 0.820
(0.092) (0.160) (0.135) (154)
1995-2001 (7) 2.820a 2.136 2.883a -5125a 0.972
(0.375) (0.496) (0.339) (838)
1962-2001 (40) 0.952a -0.490 0.592 0.875
(0.076) (0.331) (0.235)
1962-1994 (33) 0.932a -0.349b -0.094 0.951
(0.080) (0.167) (0.139)
1995-2001 (7) 0.610b -0.977b 0.857 0.822
(0.238) (0.411) (0.462)
Japan 1962-2007 (46) 0.997a -0.016a 0.275a -700 0.879
1983 (0.055) (0.004) (0.088) (876)
[0.0016] 1962-1982 (21) 0.025 0.040 0.413a -1958b 0.649
(0.250) (0.035) (0.086) (853)
1983-2007 (35) 0.947a -0.015a 0.337b 133 0.709
(0.183) (0.005) (0.197) (3193)
1962-2007 (46) 0.965a -0.016a 0.218a 0.946
(0.040) (0.004) (0.046)
1962-1982 (21) 0.195 -0.008 0.269a 0.629
(0.240) (0.027) (0.051)
1983-2007 (35) 0.954a -0.015a 0.343a 0.974
(0.045) (0.005) (0.087)
USA 1962-2007 (46) 0.996a 0.023 -0.165 -1.482 0.903
(0.077) (0.026) (0.158) (13.6)
1962-2007 (46) 0.996a 0.023 -0.174 0.942
(0.076) (0.026) (0.104)
Korea 1973-2007 (35) 0.686a 0.042 0.623b -6026b 0.522
1998 (0.096) (0.088) (0.280) (2854)
 [0.0000] 1973-1997 (25) 0.850a -0.264a 0.923a -3972a 0.823
(0.139) (0.042) (0.131) (1275)
1998-2007 (10) -0.149 0.213 0.385 16944 0.563
(0.254) (0.083) (0.568) (10386)
1973-2007 (35) 0.626a 0.019 0.307b 0.510
(0.101) (0.082) (0.129)
1973-1997 (25) 0.880a -0.289a 0.739a 0.771
(0.139) (0.044) (0.101)
1998-2007 (10) 0.192 0.232 1.030a 0.854
(0.187) (0.090) (0.378)
Table A2. OLS Estimations (The Current Account/Private Credit). Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a, b, and c indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels for the one-sided test, respectively. The breaking
years of the Chow test are under country names (if any), and the values in square brackets are the p-values of
the test. Years under estimation periods (if any) are missing years for the estimation.
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Australia 1970-2007 (37) 0.802a -0.252a 0.937a -7.636a 0.900
(0.072) (0.048) (0.162) (1.327)
1970-2007 (37) 1.057a -0.177a 0.660a 0.9481
(0.089) (0.058) (0.148)
Canada 1962-2007 (46) 0.848a -0.002 0.426a -5.736a 0.835
(0.065) (0.009) (0.159) (2.393)
1962-2007 (46) 0.944a -0.022b 0.237a 0.808
(0.060) (0.010) (0.091)
Botswana 1977-2007 (31) 0.780a 0.561 0.911a -27.7 0.882
(0.079) (0.598) (0.103) (137)
1977-2007 (31) 0.775a 0.533 0.908a 0.932
(0.079) (0.560) (0.091)
India 1971-2006 (36) 0.431a -0.354b 0.205b -185a 0.316
1989 (0.138) (0.175) (0.103) (58.0)
 [0.0031] 1971-1988 (18) 0.082 0.390 -0.926 -183b 0.429
(0.164) (0.445) (0.195) (82.5)
1989-2006 (18) 0.403b -0.600a 0.535a -493a 0.650
(0.159) (0.128) (0.104) (154)
1971-2006 (36) 0.670a -0.331 0.104 0.574
(0.111) (0.215) (0.124)
1971-1988 (18) 0.229 -0.322 -0.965 0.748
(0.256) (0.427) (0.233)
1989-2006 (18) 0.641a -0.354 0.123 0.604
(0.153) (0.225) (0.131)
Austria 1962-1997 (36) 0.543a -0.055 0.329b -13.3a 0.417
(0.201) (0.077) (0.187) (5.02)
1962-1997 (36) 0.596a -0.165b 0.235 0.551
(0.225) (0.084) (0.207)
Burundi 1973-2007 (35) 0.860a -0.650 0.098 -14125 0.742
1998 (0.138) (0.539) (0.109) (10176)
[0.0001] 1973-1997 (25) 0.766a -1.871a -0.018 -14215 0.839
(0.084) (0.374) (0.070) (8662)
1998-2007 (10) 0.822a 0.941 0.638a -36843a 0.930
(0.095) (0.422) (0.168) (9659)
1973-2007 (35) 0.979a -0.708 0.107 0.939
(0.073) (0.524) (0.111)
1973-1997 (25) 0.903a -1.834a 0.009 0.962
(0.036) (0.401) (0.081)
1998-2007 (10) 1.067a 0.451 0.725a 0.973
(0.080) (0.664) (0.236)
Belgium 1962-1997 (36) 0.975a 0.071 0.064 -1.145 0.920
1980 (0.065) (0.015) (0.257) (31.7)
[0.0000] 1962-1979 (18) 1.012a -0.944a 0.492a -0.279 0.959
(0.079) (0.337) (0.087) (24.4)
1980-1997 (18) 0.846a 0.065 -0.039 66.9b 0.953
(0.061) (0.012) (0.182) (28.3)
1962-1997 (36) 0.976a 0.070 0.057 0.923
(0.082) (0.026) (0.110)
1962-1979 (18) 1.012a -0.947a 0.491a 0.970
(0.076) (0.159) (0.087)
1980-1997 (18) 0.822a 0.096 0.330b 0.954
(0.109) (0.026) (0.147)
Table A2 (Continued)
stimation periods (Obs CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
BurkinaFaso 1972-2006 (35) 0.677a -2.058b 0.057 -49002b 0.763
(0.172) (0.904) (0.109) (24419)
1972-2006 (35) 0.904a -1.667b 0.014 0.931
(0.098) (0.942) (0.096)
Bahrain 1982-2000 (19) 1.091a 0.111 0.887a -54.6a 0.922
(0.106) (0.168) (0.056) (20.8)
1982-2000 (19) 0.859a -0.173 0.841a 0.908
(0.118) (0.167) (0.105)
Belize 1986-2006 (21) 0.806a -0.994a 0.606a -29.4b 0.936
(0.058) (0.156) (0.203) (13.2)
1986-2006 (21) 0.869a -1.058a 0.505b 0.977
(0.053) (0.189) (0.221)
Bolivia 1986-2007 (22) 0.906a -0.199b 0.705a -539a 0.967
(0.036) (0.102) (0.048) (189)
1986-2007 (22) 0.911a -0.351a 0.670a 0.958
(0.059) (0.109) (0.031)
Barbados 1976-1997 (22) 0.672a 0.241 0.283 -29.6 0.510
1983 (0.126) (0.744) (0.259) (65.3)
[0.0056] 1976-1982 (7) 0.021b 1.265 0.156 -329 0.616
(0.354) (0.444) (0.269) (127)
1983-1997 (15) 0.169 -1.263b 0.273 141b 0.467
(0.203) (0.568) (0.227) (52.8)
1976-1997 (22) 0.687a 0.084 0.265 0.506
(0.133) (0.534) (0.259)
1976-1982 (7) 0.938a 1.542 0.332 0.794
(0.147) (0.740) (0.417)
1983-1997 (15) 0.500b -0.414 0.306 0.369
(0.205) (0.364) (0.255)
Bhutan 1986-2006 (21) 0.477a -2.592b 0.698a -1695a 0.715
(0.169) (1.093) (0.178) (582)
1986-2006 (21) 0.872a -1.808 0.726a 0.924
(0.135) (1.491) (0.244)
Central Africa 1987-2005 (19) 0.396 -0.710 -0.090 -18.5b 0.196
(0.229) (1.089) (0.143) (8.66)
1987-2005 (19) 0.868a -1.344 -0.084 0.827
(0.103) (0.920) (0.154)
Switzerland 1981-2007 (27) 0.926a -0.082a 0.926a -0.268 0.980
(0.026) (0.020) (0.084) (0.722)
1981-2007 (27) 0.918a -0.085a 0.916a 0.994
(0.022) (0.014) (0.083)
Chile 1976-2007 (32) 0.761a -0.007 0.270a -562a 0.678
1996 (0.160) (0.120) (0.097) (224)
[0.0000] 1976-1995 (20) 0.707a -0.352b 0.091 -315 0.730
(0.125) (0.152) (0.158) (173)
1996-2007 (12) 0.351b 0.204 0.276a -1287b 0.760
(0.140) (0.184) (0.084) (408)
1976-2007 (32) 0.930a -0.102 0.214b 0.802
(0.118) (0.104) (0.117)
1976-1995 (20) 0.809a -0.375b 0.016 0.901
(0.135) (0.170) (0.163)
1996-2007 (12) 0.684a -0.092 0.245b 0.708
(0.177) (0.151) (0.116)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Côte d'Ivoire 1963-2007 (45) 0.814a -0.368b 0.538a 21.2 0.820
1994 (0.074) (0.169) (0.108) (32.2)
[0.0003] 1963-1993 (31) 0.870a -0.407a 0.631a 1.257 0.845
(0.074) (0.160) (0.096) (31.5)
1994-2007 (14) -0.309 1.214 -0.023 867a 0.634
(0.151) (0.292) (0.044) (114)
1963-2007 (45) 0.846a -0.343b 0.554a 0.905
(0.049) (0.153) (0.102)
1963-1993 (31) 0.872a -0.405a 0.631a 0.886
(0.058) (0.140) (0.090)
1994-2007 (14) 0.881a -0.362 0.363b 0.930
(0.074) (0.715) (0.198)
Cameroon 1971-2006 (36) 0.374a -0.490b 0.098 8.27 0.421
(0.150) (0.255) (0.085) (22.5)
1971-2006 (36) 0.382a -0.484b 0.107 0.429
(0.148) (0.248) (0.080)
Colombia 1966-1985 (20) 0.797a -0.176 0.569a -1233a 0.905
(0.124) (0.161) (0.129) (395)
1966-1985 (20) 0.820a -0.449 0.353b 0.707
(0.128) (0.273) (0.151)
Costta Rica 1962-2001 (40) 0.890a -0.204 0.085b -26.8b 0.786
1987 (0.075) (0.156) (0.037) (11.0)
 [0.0000] 1962-1986 (25) 0.963a -0.695a 0.422a -17.5b 0.919
(0.050) (0.167) (0.097) (8.318)
1987-2001 (15) -0.082 -0.382b 0.038 -248a 0.414
(0.212) (0.182) (0.034) (39.5)
1962-2001 (40) 1.052a -0.099 0.142a 0.955
(0.058) (0.167) (0.054)
1962-1986 (25) 1.057a -0.771a 0.378a 0.973
(0.046) (0.180) (0.093)
1987-2001 (15) 1.100a 0.035 0.096b 0.950
(0.086) (0.222) (0.053)
Cyprus 1962-2007 (46) 0.724a -0.184b 0.239 -37.3 0.500
(0.190) (0.087) (0.206) (30.0)
1962-2007 (46) 0.799a -0.211a 0.182 0.721
(0.146) (0.082) (0.199)
Germany 1962-1989 (28) 0.664a -0.093 0.747a -4.02 0.849
(0.080) (0.076) (0.109) (6.50)
1962-1989 (28) 0.655a -0.135a 0.718a 0.929
(0.072) (0.048) (0.100)
Dominica 1982-2005 (24) 0.816a -0.027 1.043a -38.6a 0.702
(0.114) (0.381) (0.209) (11.2)
1982-2005 (24) 1.067a -0.251 1.069a 0.952
(0.071) (0.381) (0.224)
Denmark 1971-2007 (37) 0.874a 0.017 0.681a -4.871 0.872
1987 (0.068) (0.012) (0.161) (3.043)
[0.0054] 1971-1986 (16) 0.136 -0.417a 0.437b -16.3a 0.500
(0.194) (0.102) (0.196) (5.189)
1987-2007 (21) 0.714a 0.017 0.658a 4.932 0.789
(0.079) (0.012) (0.248) (3.885)
1971-2007 (37) 0.857a 0.010 0.501a 0.888
(0.064) (0.012) (0.124)
1971-1986 (16) 0.788a -0.542a 0.280b 0.696
(0.129) (0.130) (0.125)
1987-2007 (21) 0.768a 0.020 0.780a 0.942
(0.082) (0.011) (0.203)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Dominican Republic 1981-2007 (27) 1.108a 0.348 0.109 -1055 0.733
(0.155) (0.201) (0.150) (4506)
1981-2007 (27) 1.138a 0.355 0.107 0.973
(0.070) (0.198) (0.145)
Algeria 1982-2007 (26) 0.971a -0.095a 0.962a -47.6a 0.986
1989 (0.020) (0.032) (0.028) (18.9)
 [0.0053] 1982-1988 (7) -1.136 0.897 -0.127 -21.5 0.578
(0.709) (0.534) (0.381) (28.0)
1989-2007 (19) 0.980a -0.143a 0.987a -57.2a 0.995
(0.021) (0.049) (0.033) (19.0)
1982-2007 (26) 0.935a -0.036 0.906a 0.987
(0.017) (0.041) (0.031)
1982-1988 (7) -1.272 0.831 -0.181 0.540
(0.815) (0.480) (0.449)
1989-2007 (19) 0.935a -0.023 0.918a 0.994
(0.017) (0.028) (0.028)
Ecuador 1962-1999 (38) 0.289 -0.501b 0.085 -34941 0.276
1979 (0.246) (0.257) (0.076) (25535)
 [0.0011] 1962-1978 (17) 0.299 -1.364a 0.250a -83473 0.611
(0.257) (0.329) (0.055) (52787)
1979-1999 (21) -0.004 -0.210 0.009 13835 0.098
(0.264) (0.272) (0.073) (15296)
1962-1999 (38) 0.374 -0.443b 0.096 0.290
(0.230) (0.251) (0.075)
1962-1978 (17) 0.486b -1.613a 0.231a 0.648
(0.226) (0.540) (0.057)
1979-1999 (21) -0.026 -0.237 0.002 0.135
(0.257) (0.260) (0.071)
Egypt 1962-2007 (46) 0.842a -0.080 0.194 -3465a 0.718
(0.087) (0.127) (0.151) (1022)
1962-2007 (46) 0.990a -0.093 0.148 0.91
(0.091) (0.136) (0.158)
Spain 1975-1998 (24) 0.744a -0.197b 0.785b -1302 0.703
(0.149) (0.113) (0.348) (758)
1975-1998 (24) 0.957a -0.196b 0.418 0.907
(0.103) (0.101) (0.282)
Ethiopia 1969-2001 (33) 1.077a -0.027 0.042 -88.2 0.865
(0.119) (0.194) (0.070) (299)
1969-2001 (33) 1.105a -0.008 0.046 0.938
(0.058) (0.165) (0.073)
Finland 1962-1999 (38) 0.729a -0.131a 0.745a -4.98a 0.952
(0.044) (0.036) (0.085) (1.023)
1962-1999 (38) 0.765a -0.206a 0.461a 0.925
(0.046) (0.039) (0.060)
Fiji 1972-2005 (34) 0.916a 0.092 0.001 -31.3 0.538
(0.204) (0.431) (0.160) (24.2)
1972-2005 (34) 0.954a -0.064 -0.037 0.659
(0.196) (0.411) (0.154)
France 1962-1997 (36) 0.912a -0.055 0.326 -19.7 0.811
(0.098) (0.055) (0.275) (40.3)
1962-1997 (36) 0.905a -0.077a 0.197b 0.829
(0.089) (0.023) (0.081)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Gabon 1970-2005 (36) 1.001a -0.532 0.901a -29.3 0.969
1990 (0.041) (0.613) (0.036) (25.6)
 [0.0095] 1970-1989 (20) 1.043a 0.903 0.922a -53.8b 0.930
(0.079) (0.459) (0.086) (23.8)
1990-2005 (16) 1.022a -1.806a 0.906a -43.4 0.986
(0.034) (0.422) (0.040) (28.6)
1970-2005 (36) 0.958a -0.744 0.873a 0.982
(0.019) (0.549) (0.036)
1970-1989 (20) 0.923a 0.177 0.809a 0.938
(0.044) (0.624) (0.099)
1990-2005 (16) 0.964a -1.823a 0.878a 0.995
(0.016) (0.459) (0.036)
Ghana 1966-1997 (32) 0.900a -0.264 0.220a -19.53 0.697
(0.115) (0.460) (0.062) (17.0)
1966-1997 (32) 0.980a -0.212 0.224a 0.801
(0.095) (0.464) (0.072)
Grenada 1988-2007 (20) 0.950a 0.100 0.469 -41.3 0.688
(0.193) (0.677) (0.648) (34.0)
1988-2007 (20) 1.047a 0.286 0.564 0.920
(0.150) (0.595) (0.609)
Guatemala 1981-2006 (26) 1.038a 0.398 0.269a -985 0.929
(0.049) (2.127) (0.105) (954)
1981-2006 (26) 1.105a 0.655 0.249a 0.978
(0.037) (2.32) (0.089)
Honduras 1962-2007 (46) 1.121a -0.325b 0.219 295 0.954
(0.045) (0.135) (0.164) (419)
1962-2007 (46) 1.105a -0.310a 0.229 0.979
(0.042) (0.127) (0.159)
Hungary 1985-2007 (23) 0.575b 0.169 0.061 -107 0.471
(0.242) (0.075) (0.285) (71.6)
1985-2007 (23) 0.663a 0.121 0.074 0.456
(0.261) (0.058) (0.326)
Indonesia 1983-2007 (25) 0.401b -0.170a 0.289 -21404b 0.420
(0.203) (0.063) (0.216) (9048)
1983-2007 (25) 0.436b -0.173b 0.068 0.389
(0.201) (0.072) (0.172)
Ireland 1962-1998 (37) 0.840a -0.262a 0.576a -506a 0.876
1976 (0.059) (0.073) (0.108) (116)
 [0.0064] 1962-1975 (14) 0.671a -0.132 0.767a -516a 0.832
(0.067) (0.101) (0.089) (124)
1976-1998 (23) 0.634a -0.221a 0.788a -1436a 0.910
(0.084) (0.064) (0.144) (324)
1962-1998 (37) 0.983a -0.299a 0.469a 0.937
(0.057) (0.083) (0.116)
1962-1975 (14) 0.991a -0.306 0.688a 0.876
(0.168) (0.184) (0.107)
1976-1998 (23) 0.985a -0.267a 0.414a 0.945
(0.064) (0.105) (0.151)
Iceland 1971-2006 (34) 0.654a -0.912a 0.739a -8589a 0.869
1983, 1984 (0.212) (0.064) (0.198) (0.008)
1971-2006 (34) 0.731a -0.209a 0.558a 0.883
1983, 1984 (0.231) (0.069) (0.199)
Israel 1977-2008 (32) 0.726a 0.075 0.053 -10712 0.544
(0.121) (0.105) (0.217) (5563)
1977-2008 (32) 0.930a -0.041 -0.061 0.929
(0.068) (0.098) (0.198)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Italy 1966-1998 (33) 0.827a -0.103 0.607a -11.9 0.739
(0.069) (0.120) (0.243) (8.55)
1966-1998 (33) 0.793a -0.153 0.350a 0.740
(0.069) (0.115) (0.099)
Jamaica 1971-2007 (37) 1.086a -0.184 0.305b -382 0.886
1993 (0.067) (0.227) (0.143) (2918)
 [0.0066] 1971-1992 (22) 0.564a -0.800a 0.372b -11877b 0.624
(0.208) (0.173) (0.182) (5211)
1993-2007 (25) 1.042a 0.037 0.184 -5343 0.876
(0.122) (0.375) (0.222) (8965)
1971-2007 (37) 1.093a -0.183 0.306b 0.965
(0.039) (0.224) (0.139)
1993-2007 (25) 1.002a -0.734a 0.587a 0.940
(0.062) (0.204) (0.153)
1971-2007 (37) 1.114a 0.032 0.167 0.98
(0.047) (0.381) (0.177)
Jordan 1979-2004 (26) 0.613a -0.038 0.355 -613b 0.229
(0.203) (0.297) (0.316) (270)
1979-2004 (26) 1.059a 0.047 0.567 0.967
(0.068) (0.340) (0.298)
Kenya 1966-2006 (41) 0.655a -0.879 -0.235 -22100 0.578
1994 (0.185) (0.561) (0.338) (12102)
 [0.0000] 1966-1993 (28) 0.561a -1.640a 0.305a -12083 0.686
(0.110) (0.525) (0.104) (5985)
1994-2006 (13) 0.355 -1.465b -0.513 -87059 0.680
(0.354) (0.723) (0.204) (39084)
1966-2006 (41) 0.806a -0.895 -0.271 0.792
(0.128) (0.705) (0.349)
1966-1993 (28) 0.700a -1.929a 0.303a 0.899
(0.088) (0.542) (0.114)
1994-2006 (13) 0.837a 0.178 -0.904 0.863
(0.175) (0.511) (0.246)
St. Kitts and Nevis 1982-2007 (26) 0.727a -0.843 0.498b -32.0 0.516
(0.162) (0.512) (0.205) (19.5)
1982-2007 (26) 0.866a -1.192b 0.446b 0.902
(0.125) (0.493) (0.229)
Kuwait 1976-2007 (30) 1.014a -0.254 1.001a -3.360 0.927
1991, 1992 (0.073) (0.299) (0.091) (239)
1966-2006 (41) 0.806a -0.895 -0.271 0.792
1991, 1992 (0.128) (0.705) (0.349)
St. Lucia 1986-2007 (22) 0.692a -0.764b 0.795b -46.0b 0.602
(0.193) (0.433) (0.391) (22.2)
1986-2007 (22) 0.839a -0.847b 0.763b 0.831
(0.200) (0.429) (0.376)
Sri Lanka 1962-2007 (46) 1.017a -0.067 0.454a -10979b 0.839
(0.061) (0.136) (0.171) (4720)
1962-2007 (46) 1.115a -0.043 0.421a 0.948
(0.048) (0.128) (0.174)
Lesotho 1981-2006 (22) 0.9589a -0.567 0.149 -142 0.8261
1997-2000 (0.091) (0.867) (0.267) (150)
1981-2006 (22) 1.031a -0.630 0.130 0.970
1997-2000 (0.049) (0.854) (0.263)
Luxembourg 1971-1998 (25) 0.632a 0.082 0.243 18.7 0.459
1994-1996 (0.229) (0.149) (0.314) (10.9)
1971-1998 (25) 0.859a 0.193 0.304 0.912
1994-1996 (0.124) (0.203) (0.314)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Morocco 1962-2007 0.863a -0.054 0.393a -2.44b 0.764
(0.058) (0.129) (0.104) (1.096)
1962-2007 (46) 0.922a -0.158 0.339a 0.806
(0.066) (0.109) (0.101)
Madagascar 1967-2007 (39) 1.018a 0.392 0.102 -19.0 0.825
1979, 1980 (0.071) (0.499) (0.094) (27.3)
1967-2007 (39) 1.052a 0.432 0.085 0.929
1979, 1980 (0.054) (0.409) (0.089)
Mexico 1980-2007 (28) 0.708a 0.055 -0.141 7.668 0.561
(0.165) (0.107) (0.189) (32.4)
1980-2007 (28) 0.728a 0.065 -0.109 0.565
(0.136) (0.124) (0.105)
Mali 1990-2007 (18) 0.125 0.600 -0.210 -160a 0.191
(0.234) (0.430) (0.140) (51.6)
1990-2007 (18) 0.963a 0.305 -0.146 0.943
(0.087) (0.491) (0.181)
Malta 1963-2007 (45) 0.844a -0.096 0.708 -22.9a 0.524
(0.210) (0.173) (0.465) (6.481)
1963-2007 (45) 0.982a -0.208 0.720 0.731
(0.225) (0.189) (0.465)
Mauritius 1965-2007 (43) 0.868a -0.457a 0.800a -958a 0.858
(0.070) (0.072) (0.114) (321)
1965-2007 (43) 0.930a -0.554a 0.747a 0.879
(0.066) (0.066) (0.124)
Malawi 1983-2005 (23) 1.387a 0.333 0.225b 2734 0.703
(0.303) (1.073) (0.128) (3847)
1983-2005 (23) 1.220a -0.132 0.206b 0.894
(0.130) (1.041) (0.105)
Malaysia 1962-2007 (46) 0.862a 0.069 0.885a -4145a 0.953
1998 (0.062) (0.115) (0.218) (1255)
 [0.0000] 1962-1997 (26) 0.895a -0.121a 0.717a -2037a 0.795
(0.124) (0.029) (0.163) (830)
1998-2007 (20) 0.789a 0.466 0.464b 3631 0.953
(0.070) (0.151) (0.193) (3963)
1962-2007 (46) 0.847a 0.006 0.789a 0.949
(0.072) (0.113) (0.235)
1962-1997 (26) 0.867a -0.162a 0.589a 0.787
(0.148) (0.030) (0.136)
1998-2007 (20) 0.823a 0.476 0.523b 0.993
(0.047) (0.130) (0.209)
Niger 1971-2004 (34) 0.874a 0.090 0.055 -16.4 0.419
(0.289) (0.337) (0.080) (21.9)
1971-2004 (34) 1.056a 0.219 0.069 0.883
(0.075) (0.349) (0.079)
Nigeria 1963-2004 (42) 0.402a 1.090 0.452a -10.3 0.449
(0.187) (1.045) (0.153) (41.5)
1963-2004 (42) 0.397b 1.025 0.447a 0.466
(0.176) (0.977) (0.150)
Norway 1962-2006 (45) 0.409 0.428 0.890a -8.397 0.351
(0.275) (0.341) (0.172) (20.1)
1962-2006 (45) 0.410 0.357 0.841a 0.401
(0.266) (0.323) (0.189)
Nepal 1977-2007 (31) 0.865a -0.398 0.086 -3537 0.894
(0.069) (0.262) (0.112) (1622)
1977-2007 (31) 0.968a -0.370 0.061 0.973
(0.033) (0.276) (0.108)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
New Zealand 1962-2007 (46) 0.932a -0.071 0.675a -1096a 0.797
1993 (0.132) (0.097) (0.194) (365)
[0.0022] 1962-1992 (31) 0.787a 0.063 0.741a -1423a 0.743
(0.123) (0.041) (0.186) (388)
1993-2007 (15) 0.455 -0.446b 1.191a -3118a 0.880
(0.318) (0.243) (0.214) (675)
1962-2007 (46) 1.072a -0.084 0.629b 0.902
(0.141) (0.094) (0.266)
1962-1992 (31) 1.012a 0.008 0.688b 0.813
(0.132) (0.069) (0.029)
1993-2007 (15) 0.740b -0.373 0.457 0.964
(0.398) (0.321) (0.325)
Netherlands 1962-1998 (37) 0.973a -0.024 0.579a -0.025 0.885
1981 (0.066) (0.020) (0.156) (0.015)
[0.0000] 1962-1980 (19) 0.813a 0.019 0.590a -0.057b 0.745
(0.100) (0.057) (0.214) (0.023)
1981-1998 (18) 0.579a -0.070a 1.102a 0.060b 0.888
(0.080) (0.020) (0.250) (0.021)
1962-1998 (37) 0.911a -0.026 0.411a 0.929
(0.056) (0.019) (0.142)
1962-1980 (19) 0.770a -0.101a 0.290b 0.691
(0.126) (0.039) (0.129)
1981-1998 (18) 0.718a -0.076a 1.295a 0.977
(0.098) (0.028) (0.342)
Pakistan 1971-2007 (37) 0.826a -0.927a 0.140 3.17 0.604
1998 (0.130) (0.254) (0.118) (14.3)
 [0.0000] 1971-1997 (27) 0.552b 0.219 0.126 -31.6b 0.208
(0.246) (0.369) (0.214) (14.0)
1998-2007 (10) 1.140a -2.207a -0.198 208a 0.933
(0.107) (0.340) (0.080) (54.2)
1971-2007 (37) 0.817a -0.908a 0.149 0.692
(0.123) (0.237) (0.112)
1971-1997 (27) 0.690a -0.014 -0.125 0.496
(0.237) (0.420) (0.181)
1998-2007 (10) 0.880a -1.077a 0.196 0.799
(0.139) (0.213) (0.147)
Panama 1962-2007 (46) 0.576a 0.012 -0.224 -59.7 0.402
(0.187) (0.128) (0.197) (61.6)
1962-2007 (46) 0.587a -0.032 -0.316 0.564
(0.181) (0.123) (0.163)
Philippines 1971-2007 (37) 0.916a -0.101 0.724a -28.0b 0.973
1986 (0.030) (0.070) (0.113) (12.9)
 [0.0056] 1971-1985 (15) 0.452 -0.496a 0.394 -25.0a 0.487
(0.366) (0.111) (0.361) (13.2)
1986-2007 (22) 0.884a -0.065 0.960a -54.0a 0.994
(0.024) (0.040) (0.073) (8.33)
1971-2007 (37) 0.956a -0.107 0.514a 0.967
(0.040) (0.081) (0.062)
1971-1985 (15) 0.697a -0.496b 0.391 0.688
(0.319) (0.204) (0.344)
1986-2007 (22) 0.951a -0.068 0.548a 0.983
(0.045) (0.084) (0.068)
Papua New Guinea 1976-2004 (29) 0.616a -0.469 0.260 27.3 0.424
(0.211) (1.517) (0.285) (134)
1976-2004 (29) 0.621a -0.431 0.276 0.428
(0.209) (1.482) (0.263)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Poland 1983-2007 (25) 0.819a -0.061 0.120 0.120 0.672
1991 (0.163) (0.043) (0.127) (0.127)
 [0.0000] 1983-1990 (8) 1.587a -0.020 0.076a -5141 0.958
(0.134) (0.010) (0.013) (3171)
1991-2007 (17) 0.565a -0.408a 0.794 -17491a 0.840
(0.111) (0.110) (0.130) (2371)
1983-2007 (25) 0.838a -0.048 0.094 0.668
(0.157) (0.033) (0.085)
1983-1990 (8) 1.301a -0.024 0.054b 0.978
(0.077) (0.019) (0.023)
1991-2007 (17) 0.912a 0.043 0.284b 0.630
(0.279) (0.491) (0.138)
Portugal 1962-1997 (36) 0.985a -0.006 0.746b -227b 0.844
1986 (0.059) (0.128) (0.317) (87.1)
 [0.0001] 1962-1985 (24) 0.938a -0.237b 0.936a -156b 0.946
(0.042) (0.120) (0.193) (66.7)
1986-1997 (12) 0.280 0.319 0.722 -2008b 0.375
(0.358) (0.229) (0.460) (709)
1962-1997 (36) 1.075a -0.094 0.640b 0.952
(0.049) (0.113) (0.369)
1962-1985 (24) 1.006a -0.363a 0.757a 0.977
(0.045) (0.103) (0.155)
1986-1997 (12) 1.169a 0.139 0.762 0.947
(0.070) (0.149) (0.786)
Paraguay 1964-2007 (44) 0.854a 0.109 0.380a -331a 0.756
(0.086) (0.163) (0.084) (74.8)
1964-2007 (44) 1.012a -0.131 0.275a 0.857
(0.075) (0.188) (0.098)
Rwanda 1970-2005 (32) 0.979a 0.246 0.181b -8.84 0.817
1994-1997 (0.098) (0.320) (0.091) (9.30)
1970-2005 (32) 1.073a 0.184 0.181b 0.954
1994-1997 (0.027) (0.346) (0.094)
Saudi Arabia 1974-2007 (34) 0.838a 0.633 0.627a -1.558 0.949
(0.075) (0.448) (0.133) (5.022)
1974-2007 (34) 0.834a 0.609 0.626a 0.972
(0.081) (0.399) (0.131)
Senegal 1971-2001 (31) 0.522a -0.265 0.091 -53.6a 0.255
(0.186) (0.688) (0.099) (17.4)
1971-2001 (31) 0.992a -0.016 0.100 0.809
(0.105) (0.743) (0.129)
Singapore 1981-2007 (27) 0.903a -0.011 0.987a -1325 0.954
(0.059) (0.115) (0.163) (957)
1981-2007 (27) 0.889a -0.061 0.890a 0.978
(0.063) (0.089) (0.140)
Sierra Leone 1966-2003 (38) 0.848a -1.421b 0.018 -29539 0.636
(0.126) (0.735) (0.067) (18133)
1966-2003 (38) 0.920a -1.319 0.013 0.712
(0.127) (0.783) (0.071)
Suriname 1970-1997 (28) 0.423 -1.657b 0.608b -53.6 0.511
(0.473) (0.736) (0.321) (42.2)
1970-1997 (28) 0.613b -1.314b 0.683 0.554
(0.357) (0.641) (0.409)
Sweden 1962-2001 (40) 0.778a -0.065a 0.759a -6.74b 0.958
(0.031) (0.009) (0.060) (2.51)
1962-2001 (40) 0.736a -0.081a 0.648a 0.957
(0.037) (0.012) (0.039)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
Swaziland 1973-2006 (34) 0.871a -1.348b 0.168 -77.7 0.744
(0.076) (0.603) (0.241) (105)
1973-2006 (34) 0.917a -1.475a 0.138 0.872
(0.060) (0.535) (0.236)
Seychelles 1978-1998 (21) 0.897a -0.980 0.283 -53.3 0.412
(0.315) (0.853) (0.189) (92.3)
1978-1998 (21) 1.058a -1.152 0.317 0.899
(0.095) (0.677) (0.200)
Syrian Arab Republic 1965-2006 (42) 0.906a -0.066 0.135 -3622 0.810
1997 (0.086) (0.416) (0.129) (4368)
[0.0027] 1965-1996 (32) 0.773a -1.393a -0.120 -9424b 0.776
(0.097) (0.552) (0.094) (4597)
1997-2006 (10) 0.900a -0.923 0.573b -5123 0.657
(0.208) (0.883) (0.277) (10314)
1965-2006 (42) 0.939a -0.147 0.109 0.857
(0.073) (0.429) (0.121)
1965-1996 (32) 0.905a -1.143b -0.151 0.911
(0.074) (0.596) (0.099)
1997-2006 (10) 0.833a -0.855 0.499b 0.856
(0.124) (0.821) (0.190)
Togo 1973-2007 (35) 0.831a 0.101 0.482a -29.1 0.609
(0.147) (0.478) (0.190) (17.4)
1973-2007 (35) 1.019a 0.042 0.518b 0.853
(0.075) (0.529) (0.190)
Thailand 1968-2007 (40) 0.828a -0.082 1.042a -86.5a 0.842
1997 (0.142) (0.071) (0.185) (15.3)
 [0.0029] 1968-1996 (29) 0.577a -0.237a 0.576a -52.1a 0.927
(0.152) (0.060) (0.142) (16.7)
1997-2007 (11) 0.891a 0.035 1.101a -86.7 0.633
(0.258) (0.117) (0.304) (72.5)
1968-2007 (40) 0.751a -0.116 0.672a 0.756
(0.151) (0.088) (0.168)
1968-1996 (29) 0.841a -0.187a 0.372a 0.935
(0.132) (0.068) (0.129)
1997-2007 (11) 0.687a 0.001 0.852a 0.842)
(0.189) (0.110) (0.188)
Trinidad and Tobago 1962-2001 (40) 0.441a -0.411b 0.611a -435 0.601
(0.169) (0.221) (0.106) (340)
1962-2001 (40) 0.470a -0.494b 0.596a 0.601
(0.153) (0.260) (0.106)
Turkey 1989-2007 (19) 0.173 -0.579 0.133 -2611b 0.268
(0.467) (0.424) (0.129) (1140)
1989-2007 (19) 0.519 -0.492 0.136 0.412
(0.420) (0.434) (0.115)
Uganda 1984-2006 (23) 1.247a 4.317 -0.192 27.3 0.891
(0.184) (2.844) (0.134) (93.6)
1984-2006 (23) 1.224a 4.237 -0.180 0.967
(0.126) (2.624) (0.115)
Uruguay 1978-2007 (30) 0.558a -0.058 -0.090 -1662 0.396
(0.153) (0.035) (0.056) (964)
1978-2007 (30) 0.752a -0.053 -0.115 0.679
(0.104) (0.042) (0.053)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
country 
Breaking year 
[P-value of the Chow test]
St. Vincent 1980-2006 (27) 0.719a 0.066 1.467a -63.7a 0.569
and the Grenadines (0.143) (0.598) (0.318) (19.1)
1999 1980-1998 (19) 0.385a -1.552b 1.448a -65.4a 0.715
[0.0023] (0.116) (0.631) (0.289) (17.4)
1999-2006 (8) 0.522b 2.356 1.379a -161b 0.904
(0.182) (0.624) (0.353) (36.9)
1980-2006 (27) 1.021a -0.650 1.238a 0.878
(0.105) (0.572) (0.371)
1980-1998 (19) 0.752a -2.182a 1.014a 0.902
(0.099) (0.668) (0.316)
1999-2006 (8) 1.284a 0.576 2.008b 0.932
(0.185) (0.453) (0.738)
Venezuela 1974-2007 (34) 0.636a -0.346a 0.742a 0.573 0.701
(0.060) (0.099) (0.138) (0.700)
1974-2007 (34) 0.675a -0.349a 0.763a 0.859
(0.068) (0.098) (0.127)
South Africa 1964-2007 (44) 0.839a -0.107a 0.542a -7121a 0.612
1986 (0.151) (0.040) (0.187) (2871)
 [0.0011] 1964-1985 (22) 0.613a 0.096 0.883a -14308a 0.720
(0.152) (0.082) (0.156) (2807)
1986-2007 (22) 1.149a -0.066b 0.312 -5453 0.777
(0.183) (0.027) (0.191) -5302
1964-2007 (44) 0.851a -0.123a 0.354a 0.629
(0.145) (0.036) (0.155)
1964-1985 (22) 0.744a -0.212 0.645b 0.497
(0.207) (0.123) (0.258)
1986-2007 (22) 1.092a -0.078a 0.156 0.794
(0.207) (0.023) (0.126)
Table A2 (Continued)
period (Obs.) CA(-1) DPC(-1) DZ CONS R-squared
